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Foreword
This paper examines the forms of involvement of the social partners in
formulating and implementing active labour market policies (ALMPs). The study
begins with a summary on the role of the social partners in the design and
implementation of active measures, followed by four national case studies for France,
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  In a separate section, a
quantitative analysis is added to establish a statistical relationship between patterns of
industrial relations and levels of expenditure on ALMPs in OECD countries.
Two principal channels of influence of the social partners have been identified
in this study: first, general political influence, a salient feature in particular for
countries with corporatist industrial relations, and second, influence through tripartite
participations in the management of public employment services.   In addition, the
authors briefly review other possible channels of influence of the social partners
through the organization of training and employment programmes and through
collective bargaining.  
The authors acknowledge that these two most important channels of influence
of the social partners have been weakened for two reasons.  First, generally speaking
the institutions of corporatism are less influential than in the past due to the
globalization of production and the declining influence of trade unions.  Next,  the
principle of independence of public employment services has been eroded by increased
interventions of governments due in part to resource constraints of the employment
service agencies. 
 By examining the public employment services of four Western European states
in detail, the authors come to the following conclusion: rather than the institutionalized
form of participation by social partners in the administration of public employment
services per se, the presence of cooperative social dialogue and partnership in
corporatist institutions on the societal level is the key to facilitate the effective design
and implementation of ALMPs.  Such a cooperative culture of industrial relations is
deeply rooted in national traditions.  While it is more difficult to build up and sustain
effective ALMPs under the tripartite framework in countries with no tradition of social
partnership, efficient tripartite involvement in policy making and in the implementation
of ALMPs itself might promote social partnership and corporatist structure in the long
run.           
Gek-Boo Ng
Chief
Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch
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Even in the industrial relations literature this terminology is primarily
encountered in continental countries, especially Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands, and is not firmly established in the English language literature. A
search of standard English sources such as the International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, the Encyclopedia Britannica or the Oxford English Dictionary
yielded no entries under these terms. By contrast comparable German language sources
(e.g. the Handwörterbuch der Wirschaftswissenschaften) not only devote considerable
space to these terms but also claim that the concept is of Austro-German origins and
came into vogue there in the post-WWII period. This terminology is also frequently
encountered in internal organizations where direct representation of the 'social
partners' in policy deliberations is frequently institutionalized (for example, in
the International  labour Organization and in the Economic and Social Council of the
European Union). 
I. Comparative report: The role of the social partners in the
design and implementation of active measures
1. Introduction: The "social partners" and active  labour market policies 1 
The terms "social partners," i.e. employer and employee representatives,
and "social partnership," i.e. the (idealized) co-operative relationship between
them, are frequently encountered in the industrial relations literature and policy
discussions. Although the terms themselves are apparently of Austro-German
origin,2 the ideas behind them are certainly found more or less strongly represented in
other countries as well. "Social partnership" as a philosophy for dealing with social
conflict between capital and  labour has diverse intellectual roots in late 19th and early
20th century ideological currents in Europe, especially in Catholic social theory, e.g.
Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadregesimo Anno (1931), reform liberalism, and
reformist wings of the trade unions and socialist parties. In contrast to laissez-faire
liberalism, the philosophy of "social partnership" advocated recognition of workers'
rights, including the right to trade union organization, and co-operative industrial
relations in collaboration with workers' representatives. In contrast to socialist and
Marxist protagonists of class conflict and revolutionary change, advocates of social
partnership strove for an accommodation of the interests of capital and  labour and for
constructive reform. 
In more contemporary terms, conflict between capital and  labour is not regarded
as a zero-sum game, in which one party gains only at the expense of the other, but as a
positive-sum game in which both parties stand to gain from co-operative solutions (or
both might lose as a result of non-cooperative behavior). The common interest of the
social partners is in the economic prosperity of the firm, industry or national economy
at the micro, meso and macro levels respectively. Interest conflicts pertain primarily to
the terms of the 'partnership,' i.e. distributional issues (wages and benefits) with respect
to the co-operative gain. Moreover, an important premise of "social partnership" is the
right of employees to form unions to represent their interests, which still has not been
universally achieved. State regulation plays of course a constitutive role for the interest
23
 It should be noted that active labour market policies are not identical with
employment policies. Thus the OECD's strict definition of "active" policies: 1) Only
includes government financed services and programmes  and not the private sector,
for example, employment policies at the firm and sectoral levels based on collective
agreement,  except insofar as they are publicly financed; 2) Only includes selective
labour market interventions for the benefit of special categories of individuals and
not  general employment policy measures such as changes in taxation and social
security contributions are not included. 3) Even excludes in principle public
programmes  to promote withdrawal from the labour market (e.g. early retirement for
labour market reasons, short-time work), which are classified as "passive" labour
market policy. 5) Does not include state aids to specific firms and industries (e.g.
German coal industry), which  are classified as industrial policy rather than labour
market programmes . 
organizations of the social partners and for the industrial relations system; social
partnership is in fact a ménage à trois. 
Since this report is concerned with the role of the social partners in the design and
implementation of "active measures," some remarks about the meaning of the latter term
are appropriate. The term "active labour market policy," in contrast to "passive" labour
market policy, has been widely disseminated in policy communities by the OECD,
although it is not uncontroversial (e.g. Dayan 1995; Therborn 1985). Citing the OECD as
the origin of the term, the ILO offers the following definition: "purposive, selective
interventions by the government in the pursuit of efficiency and/or equity objectives, acting
indirectly or directly to provide work to, or increase the employability of people with certain
disadvantages in the labour market." The OECD includes the following categories of labour
market policy expenditure as active policies:1) Public employment services and administration;
2) labour market training for unemployed and employed adults; 3) youth measures; 4)
subsidized employed (e.g. wage subsidies and direct job creation); 5) measures for the
disabled.3 
In examining the role of the social partners with regard to active labour market policies,
it is useful to distinguish four different channels of influence:
1. Corporatism: The special role of the organizations of the social partners in the political
decision-making process, especially with regard to economic and social issues that
affect them. Like other societal actors, the social partners participate in and exercise
influence through the general political process. In many countries the organizations of
the social partners have a special relationship with government with respect to policy
making on economic and social issues, which has been analyzed in political science
under the heading of "neo-corporatism." Corporatist patterns in wage bargaining and
their impact on economic performance have been analyzed in industrial relations and
economics (e.g. Appelbaum and Schettkat and 1997). This is not the place to enter into
a detailed discussion of various definitions of corporatism in the recent literature.
Suffice it to say that, in contrast to pluralist theory, the neo-corporatist approach
stresses the importance of organized interests, especially the role of employers'
organizations and trade unions, in regulating industrial relations and in policy-making
(Marks et al. 1997; Traxler 1993).
2. Tripartism in employment services: Institutionalized direct participation in the
formulation and implementation of labour market policies, especially in tripartite labour
market authorities. In all OECD countries the social partners have some type of more
34
In a recent ILO report these two types of involvement of the social partners
in policy-making are termed "consultative" and "collaborative" organizations
respectively (ILO 1997). 
or less formal role in the formulation of labour market policies. In some countries this
takes the form of the establishment of advisory bodies to employment services or
labour ministries, which is mandated by ILO convention No. 88, the "Employment
Service Convention" of 1948. Article 4 of this convention stipulates that: "Suitable
arrangements shall be made through advisory committees for the co-operation of
representatives of employers and workers in the organization and operation of the
employment service and in the development of employment service policy." These
representatives "shall be appointed in equal numbers after consultation with
representative organizations of employers and workers, where such organizations
exist." The formal institutionalization of tripartism in the management of quasi-
independent labour market authorities, i.e. a direct and permanent role for the social
partners in the governance of the public employment service, is not mandated by the
ILO convention and less common. 4 
3. Programme  participation: An important dimension of the social partners in active
labour market policies is their participation as providers or as sponsors of measures,
for example, as training providers or as sponsors for job creation programmes  in the
private sector. Evaluation studies show that schemes in which private firms are
involved, often yield better results in terms of employment performance, which
suggests that involvement of private firms may be crucial to the success of ALMP
schemes (OECD 1996; ILO 1998). In many countries enterprise-based active measures
may require the co-operation or even approval of employee representatives as well. 
4. Collective bargaining: Pursuit of labour market policy goals through collective
agreements. Active labour market policy usually means public labour market policy,
excluding per definition active policies on the basis of collective agreement.
Nevertheless, public labour market policies may be linked to collective agreements, for
example, programmes  to promote reductions in working time or early retirement may
be predicated on regulation by a collective agreement at the firm or industry level.
Moreover, the social partners may themselves initiate policies by collective agreement
to promote employment (e.g. reductions in collective working time) or the integration
of problem groups (e.g. special entry wages for certain groups) at the firm or industry
level.
 Of the four principal types of influence of the social partners on active measures
identified, this study focuses in particular on national experiences with tripartism in public
employment services. To our knowledge this subject has never been systematically examined
in a comparative perspective. The second major focus of the comparative report is on the
impact of corporatist forms of co-ordination on labour market policies; which is investigated
in an empirical study of the impact of social partnership on the level and composition of labour
market policy expenditure in OECD countries. More detailed information on the role of
corporatist forms of interest representation, tripartite employment service institutions, and the
linkage to collective bargaining are reported below in the national case studies. The role of the
social partners as programme  participants (e.g. providers, sponsors) is beyond the scope of
45 Peter Tergeist of the OECD  called our attention to this trend. 
this study. 
2.
Tripartism in public employment services
2.1 Organizational patterns of active labour market policy in OECD
countries
The delivery systems for active labour market policies differ markedly across OECD
states. Nine countries (Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Norway, Spain) have fully integrated public employment services which are responsible both
for active and passive labour market policy, i.e. for the main national active programmes
(placement services, training, employment programmes ) as well as for the administration of
unemployment benefit (see table 1). Eight countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland) have partially integrated institutional regimes,
i.e. the main national programmes  for active measures are administered by a single local
employment service agency. In four countries (Australia, France, the United Kingdom, United
States) the delivery system for active programmes  is fragmented in two or more agencies.
Almost one half (10 of 21) or five fully integrated and four partially integrated public
employment services have tripartite self-administrations as does the placement service in the
fragmented French delivery system. Moreover, there has been considerable change in recent
years; both Sweden and the United Kingdom abandoned tripartism in the early 1990s while
Austria and the Netherlands established quasi-independent employment services with tripartite
self-management for the first time. 
The role of the social partners in the organization of unemployment benefit should also
be mentioned. In addition to their role in countries with fully integrated tripartite organizations
as noted above, the social partners are responsible for the administration of unemployment
benefits in France and the Netherlands and the trade unions alone in the Scandinavian countries
(except Norway). It should be noted parenthetically that efforts in a number of countries to
"activate" labour market policy, have led agencies responsible for unemployment benefit to
initiate active programmes , which has further complicated the implementation structure for
active policies (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Belgium). 5 
Among the four countries included in our study, Germany represents an example of a
country with a fully integrated employment service responsible for both active and passive
measures with a long and uninterrupted tradition of tripartism. The Netherlands is a country
with a partially integrated employment service in which responsibility for administration of
active and passive measures is divided between a tripartite public employment service and
bipartite sectoral unemployment insurance funds. In contrast to Germany, direct involvement
of the social partners in the administration of a quasi-independent labour market authority was
first introduced in the Netherlands in 1991 and substantially modified in 1997. In the
fragmented French institutional regime, not only is a separate organization, the bipartite
UNIDEC, responsible for passive benefits but even responsibility for the implementation of
active measures is divided between the labour ministry and its departmental offices, the public
employment service (ANPE), and AFPA, the national training authority; both ANPE and
AFPA have tripartite administrative bodies. In the United Kingdom the previous tripartite
5labour market authority, the Manpower Service Commission, was abolished at the end of the
1980s, and responsibility for active measures was divided between the Employment Service
and the privatized Training and Enterprise Councils, which are responsible for labour market
training and for most active programmes  except placement services. 
2.2 Theories and expectations about tripartism
Tripartism in employment service institutions can be regarded as a problem of
institutional design. Should the social partners be given direct and privileged responsibility for
labour market policy in tripartite labour administrations? We do not think that there is any
general answer to this question that is applicable in all countries and under all circumstances.
Nevertheless, a survey of national experience with this institutional form in labour market
policy does shed light on the potential strengths and possible shortcomings of tripartism in
labour market institutions. This section briefly summarizes five principal theories and
expectations, both positive and negative, associated with the involvement of the social partners
in tripartite employment service institutions. In the following sections, evidence on each of
these topics or hypotheses is assessed based on evidence from our survey of national
experience with tripartism in the case studies reported below. 
1. Influence of the social partners on policy making: A principal expectation is that
tripartite labour market authorities give the social partners real influence on labour
market policy above and beyond that which they have through other more general
forms of participation in the political process (e.g. party politics, lobbying) or a merely
advisory role. As discussed below, the actual influence exercised by the social partners
on labour market policy through tripartite institutions is in fact more limited than their
formal role suggests. 
2. Legitimation and lobbying function: Tripartism is assumed to increase public support
for active measures because it is indicative of a broad consensus and represents a long-
term and formalized commitment on the part of the powerful societal actors. 
3. Multi-actor policy co-ordination: The inclusion of representatives of the social partners
and other public organizations in PES governance is expected to facilitate co-operation
and induce other actors to coordinate their own activities better with PES policies; 
4. Internal conflict and deadlock: The number and diversity of the actors represented in
PES governing bodies may make decision-making more cumbersome and in worst
cases result in politicization. 
5. Insider policies:  A classical problem of the devolution of responsibility for government
functions to private actors is that the social partners like other organized interests may
not adequately reflect the public interest or even that of all their members.
66See Arbeidsvoorziening 1990, Moraal 1994, Dercksen and de Koning 1996, Visser and Hemerijck 1997 for
accounts of the Dutch PES reforms.
Table 1. Institutional regimes of active labour market policy in OECD countries,
1997
Fully Integrated Partially Integrated Fragmented Total
Tripartite
self-administration
Austria (since 1994)
Canada
Germany
Greece
Luxembourg
Belgium
Ireland
Netherlands (since 1991)
Portugal
France 10
Ministry or other Italy
Japan
Norway
Spain
Denmark
Finland
Sweden (since 1991)
Switzerland
Australia (since
1997)
UK (since 1990)
USA
11
Total 9 8 4 21
Sources: Compiled from OECD 1996; European Commission, Employment Observatory, MISEP Basic Information
Reports and national sources. Notes: In fully integrated systems PES offices are responsible for unemployment
benefit administration, placement services, and referral to active measures (training, subsidized employment
etc.) whereas in partially integrated systems the main active measures (placement services, and referral to
training, subsidized employment etc.) are integrated in the same agency but not unemployment benefit
administration. In fragmented regimes responsibility for major types of active measures is dispersed in two
or more agencies. No information is available for Iceland and New Zealand. Dates in parentheses refer to
introduction or abandonment of tripartism in PES institutions.
2.3 The influence of the social partners on active policies
A formal role for the social partners in tripartite institutions does not necessarily mean
a realinfluence on active policies. The influence of the social partners depends on the extent
to which tripartite employment service institutions exercise real autonomy vis-à-vis the state
and on the influence of the social partners within them. Our survey of experience with
tripartism in four countries indicates that the parameters of labour market policy are clearly
set by law and by government policy, which the social partners may influence through other
political channels. Tripartite public employment service institutions play an important but
clearly subordinate role in policy-making; their principal influence is rather at the level of
policy implementation. There are of course important national differences in the role and
influence of the social partners. This section presents a comparative overview and assessment
of the influence of the social partners in four employment service regimes with tripartite
institutions.
The Netherlands
In the Dutch Arbeidsvoorziening, 6 both the central and the regional boards of the new
7labour market authority, which is formally independent of the labour ministry, are tripartite
bodies. During the 1991-1996 period, the central board (CBA) consisted of three
representatives of the national organizations of the employers and trade union and three state
representatives (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Economics Ministry, Education
Ministry), while the regional (RBA) offices included representatives of employers, trade
unions, and the municipalities. At both the national and regional levels a qualified majority of
2 representatives of each group in the tripartite board was required for substantive decisions,
i.e. any group could veto a decision. The fact that the government had only three seats on the
central PES board and the need for a qualified majority meant too that policy could not be
dictated by the labour ministry. 
The new labour market authority was intended to be completely independent from the
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. This was reinforced inter alia by giving the new
organization its own statutory budget, which was supposed to provide stable financing for a
multi-year period. The autonomy of the regional PES offices was reinforced by placing them
under the direct control of the tripartite regional employment boards without any hierarchical
subordination to the national PES office. The central board and office merely formulated
overall guidelines for labour market policy. The central board was authorized to issue a
directive to the regional boards only if 6 of the 9 voting members approved such a measure;
moreover, this extraordinary majority had to include at least two voting members from each
group on the central board. 
After an evaluation of the employment service in 1995, the Dutch cabinet endorsed a
number of changes in the way tripartism is implemented. Most importantly, decisions in the
future will not be based on qualified majority voting but a simple majority will suffice, i.e. the
group veto was eliminated. Moreover, the board members will in the future be expected to
hold office in the public interest and not as interest group representatives; an even stronger
proposal in the evaluation report to limit social partners' right of nomination to persons not on
the payroll of these organizations was not implemented. The government itself will no longer
be directly represented in the central labour market board (CBA) but will nominate
independent representatives of the public interest. However, a number of changes greatly
reduce the independence of the PES and its regional offices in contrast to the previous
structure: The supervisory role of the Ministry of Social Affairs with respect to policies and
financing was strengthened, and the responsible minister may now issue directives to the PES.
Furthermore, the PES central broad is now required to confer on policies with the minister of
social affairs, and its budget is subject to the annual appropriations process. 
Germany
The German Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; BA) is the product
of a long tradition of tripartism in labour market institutions and of social partnership in
industrial relations. It is a self-governing body incorporated under public law that is
responsible for both active policies (placement, vocational counseling, labour market training
and other active programmes) as well as for the administration of unemployment benefits. Its
self-governing organs have a tripartite structure with equal representation of employees,
employers and public bodies (Federal and Land Governments, and local governments). This
principle is applied both at the national level of its Governing Council (Verwaltungsrat) and
Executive Board (Vorstand) as well as at the level of the regional and the local employment
87The Executive board is composed of 3 representatives of the social partners
as well as three public representatives (1 from the federal government, 1 from the
Bundesrat, the Federal Council of the Länder, and 1 from the Deutscher Städtetag,
the national organization of the German municipalities. The Council is composed of
17 representatives from each group. The administrative committees at the regional
and local levels consist of from 15 to 27 members (the exact number is set by the
Council). The administrative committees of the local PES offices consist of from 9
to 21 members -- the exact number is fixed by the administrative committees of the
regional PES offices.
8 Resources in the form of unemployment insurance contributions and any accumulated reserves .
offices with their tripartite administrative committees (Verwaltungsausschüsse).
Representatives of the social partners are appointed on the basis of nominations from
employers' and trade union organizations at the respective levels (§195 AFG). 7
The BA's tripartite Council and Executive Board play an important role in the selection
of principal BA officers. The presidents and vice-presidents of the BA and of the Land regional
labour offices are nominated by the Federal government and appointed by the Federal
President. However, the Federal government is required to consult with the BA's tripartite
governing Council before making nominations and may deviate from its advice only for
"serious reasons." Other top officials of the BA are nominated by the BA's executive board.
(§211 AG).
The Council enacts the statutes of the BA and issues decrees and regulations within the
scope of its autonomy. It must ratify the budget proposed by the Executive Board, which must
subsequently be approved by the Federal Government. The BA is financed through
unemployment insurance contributions by employers and employees, the contribution rate is,
however, determined by statute and not by the BA itself. 
Despite its status as a self-governing institution, the BA's independence is in practice
limited. Both administrative regulations (Anordnungen) and the budget approved by its Council
require the approval of the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs (and in some cases
the Minister of Finance). Moreover, regulations and, under certain circumstances, budgetary
changes can be directly imposed by the Minister if the BA's own administration fails to comply
with his instructions (§191, §216 AFG). 
The limited autonomy of the BA vis-à-vis the government is best illustrated by the
budget process (Linke 1994; Bruche and Reissert 1984). Although the BA has its own budget
and separate funding through contributions to unemployment insurance, 8 it has no control over
the contribution rate on the revenue side nor, for example, over benefit levels or training
stipends, which are fixed by statute. Moreover, its budget it has to be approved by the Federal
Government (the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs). Since 1993 the Minister can
implement the budget on his own authority if the Council does not accept the budgetary
stipulations imposed by the Minister. This situation can arise, only if the BA's budget is in
deficit (§216 AFG), i.e. it is unable to finance proposed expenditures through its own
resources (unemployment benefit contributions) and any reserves it may have accumulated).
However, the current high levels of structural unemployment and the high costs of transfers
to East Germany mean that there is a chronic budget deficit and that, consequently, the BA has
experienced a significant loss of independence (Linke 1994). 
The United Kingdom
99 Actually its transitory successor, the Training Commission as the MSC was called after the hiving off of
placement services to the independent Employment Service.
10 See King 1993 and Evans 1992 for surveys of these developments.
11The TECs are in fact a new variant of an older British tradition of quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental
organizations. 
12 FNE (Fonds national de l'emploi) was created by the law of the 18th December 1963. It is not a body with legal
status but a budget fund at the disposal of the employment minister. FNE aids are granted through contracts negotiated
between the employer and the administration.
The British Manpower Services Commission (1973 - 1988) integrated training and
placement services in an independent, tripartite labour market authority with its own budget,
personnel administration and subordinate regional and local organizations. Although
responsible for most active programmes , the MSC was by design strictly separated from the
aministration of unemployment benefits, which was the responsibility of a separate
organization within the Employment Department. 
The MSC's tripartite governing body included three trade union and three employer's
representatives, two representatives of local authorities, one member from the vocational
training sector, and a chairman chosen by the government. Although formally independent of
the government in its day-to-day operations, the MSC was clearly subordinate to government
policy: Its chairman was chosen by the government, and its proposals had to be approved by
the responsible minister. Moreover, its budget was controlled though the MSC's dependence
on annual grants in the government budget. The MSC may have been capable of exercising
influence, but it was never independent (Evans 1992:16-17). This relatively centralized
organization also had tripartite Area Manpower Boards, which were supposed to provide a
mechanism for co-ordination at the operative regional level, but they had only advisory status.
The MSC was abolished after the withdrawal of trade union representation in connection with
the controversy over the introduction of the Employment Training programme  for the adult
unemployed. 9 In retrospect it is not the abolition of the MSC but the survival and even
expansion of this corporatist institution during the 1980s under the Thatcher government that
is noteworthy. 10
Subsequently the government delegated responsibility for training and most active
measures to the Employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). The TECs carry out
the planning, management, and control tasks in the delivery of training and enterprise
programme s that were previously the responsibility of the former tripartite Manpower
Services Commission. In essence these management functions have now been contracted out
to private organizations with governing bodies in which local employers have by law a 2/3
majority. 11 
France 
Responsibility for the implementation of labour market policy is highly fragmented in
France, The main French employment service institutions are ANPE (French National
Employment Office), AFPA (Adult Professional Education Association), UNEDIC (National
Union for Industrial and Commercial Employment), FNE (French National Employment Fund)
12 and the employment ministry (organized at different levels). Of these institutions ANPE and
AFPA have tripartite structures in which the social partners formally share authority with
public representatives. UNEDIC is by contrast in form a purely bipartite institution based on
10
13 The ANPE's board of management consists of an appointed chairman; 5 members representing employers; 5
members representing workers; 5 members representing, respectively, the Ministers of Employment, Education, Finance,
Industry and the Minister responsible for the local authorities.
14 Trade unions recognized by law and the most important employers' organizations. 
15 Assedic (Associations pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce) - Association for industrial and commercial
employment - is comparable to Unedic. Unedic is organized at the national level, whereas Assedic is organized at territorial
level and has to join Unedic.
16 Four schemes were introduced to promote employment: the "Convention de conversion" (retraining contract),
initiated by the inter-professional agreement of the 20th October 1989; the "Allocation Formation-Reclassement" - AFR
(training/career change benefit), introduced by the inter-professional agreement of the 6th July 1988; the "Convention de
coopération" (cooperation contract), initiated by the inter-professional agreement of the 8th June 1994; the "Allocation de
Remplacement pour l'Emploi" - ARPE (job replacement benefit), introduced by the inter-professional agreement of the 6th
September 1995. In particular ARPE is considered as resulting from an "historic" agreement. All experts interviewed agreed
that ARPE is the most important measure in years with respect to the influence of social partners on active labour market
a national agreement between representatives of the social partners. This section focuses on
ANPE and UNEDIC, the two most important channels of influence of the social partners on
labour market policy in the French employment service regime. 
ANPE ("Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi") is the national employment office and the
central organization of the public placement service. Established in 1967, it is a national public
body with an independent legal status but under the authority of the employment minister. It
is governed by a board headed by a Director-General, who is appointed by the minister of
employment. In 1980 a tripartite board of management was introduced in which ANPE's users
are represented. By law the board of management deliberates on ANPE's general strategies and
development plans, cooperation agreements at the national level (in particular with UNIDEC),
and its budget. Tripartite regional and departmental committees were introduced in 1986. 13
The representatives of the employers and workers are appointed by the most representative
employers' and workers' organizations. 14
Despite its formally autonomous status, the ANPE and its governing board have
basically very little independence vis-à-vis the state (Hamoniaux, 1995). Its principal officials
(the president of the board of directors and the managing director) are appointed by the labour
minister, and the decisions of its governing board are enforceable only if approved by the
minister; and finally, its personnel is subject to civil service status. Its financial autonomy is
even more limited: 70 per cent of his budget comes from a direct state grant and the rest from
the Fonds National de l'Emploi. 
The French unemployment insurance benefit carrier UNEDIC ("Union Nationale
d'Emploi dans l'Industrie et le Commerce") is a non-profit association established in 1958 by
interprofessional agreement, i.e. by the social partners. Because the unemployment insurance
system originates from an agreement between the social partners, its decision-making bodies
are bipartite structures. UNEDIC is governed by a bipartite council which every two years
appoints a managing board from among its members. Its chairman is alternately a
representative of the employers' associations and a union representative. The managing board
has the task of managing the day-to-day operation of UNEDIC. 15 From a formal point of
view, UNEDIC corresponds exactly to the description of pure bipartism. Yet, the real
influence of the social partners is more ambiguous since the government continuously
intervenes in its activities. 
Although primarily responsible for unemployment benefits, UNEDIC's role in active
labour market policy has recently increased. In fact, since 1986 UNEDIC has been developing
a programme  of activating passive benefits. 16 These measures mark the first step in the
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policy. 
development of the social partners' own employment policy. 
Although formally a bipartite organization, the state has frequently intervened directly
in negotiations between the social partners. For example, in the tripartite agreement of 23rd
July 1993, which aims at restoring the fiscal soundness of the system, the state committed itself
to paying a subsidy, and the social partners committed themselves neither to lower the
contribution rate nor to increase benefits. A tripartite supervisory council was also established,
the "Conseil d'Orientation et de Surveillance" (COS), which is responsible for the auditing of
UNEDIC's accounts as well as for co-ordination and control measures. 
Our survey of the most important stages of UNEDIC's evolution (see French case study
below) shows the ambiguity of the relationship between the social partners and the state: The
latter seems to encourage and support the bipartite system, though it constantly intervenes. In
crisis situations conflicts between the state and the social partners typically relate to their
respective roles in financing the system. 
The social partners in four employment service regimes
Table 2 (on page 14) presents a synoptic comparison of organizational features of the
four tripartite employment service regimes surveyed. The Dutch Arbeidsvoorziening in the
1991 to 1996 period enjoyed the greatest independence in its policies and its budget decisions,
although the government's original commitment to provide the labour market authority with
a fixed four year budget allocation was in practice revoked by a series of budget cuts. The
social partners had a majority in the central board, controlled the selection of top PES officials,
and enjoyed a great deal of independence in policy making (table 2). Conflict with the
government over financial resources, the autonomy of the institution, and its policy-orientation
led, however, to a policy reversal and a clear subordination of the employment service to the
government through changes that came into effect in 1997. 
The German employment service, which is responsible not only for active measures but
also for unemployment benefits, is the product of a long tradition of tripartism in labour
market institutions and of social partnership in industrial relations. Its independence - within
the broad constraints of the Labour Promotion Act - is underlined by the unique attribute of
being autonomous in developing its own budget on the basis of financing through
unemployment insurance contributions rather than annual appropriations (table 2). Chronic
deficits in the unemployment insurance fund have, however, now rendered the BA dependent
on the government for approval of its annual budget and led to repeated conflicts between the
BA and the government. Recent statutory changes have clearly subordinated the BA's tripartite
governing council to the government in both budgetary and policy questions. Nevertheless, the
German employment service still influences policy and has significant autonomy at the
implementation level, for example, the Arbeitsamt 2000 employment service reforms.
The independence of the British Manpower Services Commission and hence the
influence of the social partners appears to have been quite limited. Its chairman was appointed
by the government; it was subject to the government's annual budget process and to ministerial
direction (table 2). Moreover, the autonomy of any tripartite institution depends not only on
its own institutional position but also on the political context. By this test too the political
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17Since unemployment insurance funds are administered by the social partners in a number of countries, the
"activation" of these funds for active measures can also be expected to lead to an increased role for the social partners in
policy formation analogous to the case of UNEDIC. 
position of the MSC in the policy process appears to have been weak: Governments are
stronger in the United Kingdom, where single-party majority governments rather than
coalitions are the rule, and the institutionalized political 'clout' of the social partners is weaker
than, for example, in Germany or the Netherlands. 
The impact of tripartite employment service institutions on policy appears to be weakest
in France. Thus, in the case of ANPE, the most important of these institutions, its top officials
are government appointees, its budget is controlled by the government, and it is subject to
ministerial direction in policy matters (table 2). In short, the social partners have no role in the
design but influence at most the implementation of active measures. Tripartite institutions
appear to largely instrumentalize the participation of the social partners for policies made by
the state. Most measures of active policy are decided by the French state without consultation
with the social partners. Policy orientation depends on the color of the government and not on
the opinions of the social partners. Other channels of influence of the social partners are
clearly more important in France. The case of UNEDIC, which is a bipartite institution based
on collective agreement rather than a tripartite institution based on law, is particularly
interesting. UNEDIC is an autonomous institution of the social partners which, in comparison
with the rather weak tripartite institutions in France, is highly independent. It selects its own
officials, has its own autonomous budget and source of financing (contributions and a regular
state subsidy), and stands in a bargaining relationship to government rather than one of
hierarchical subordination (table 2 on page 14). 17
2.4 Legitimation and lobbying function
 Tripartism in PES institutions management might be expected to be associated with
high and more stable levels of political support for active measures because it is indicative of
the existence of a broad consensus between the social partners and represents a long-term and
formalized commitment by major societal actors. This was, for example, an explicit
consideration in the establishment of a tripartite labour market authority in the United Kingdom
(MSC) ("lobbying function"; Reissert 1984) and is certainly a plausible effect of tripartism.
Nevertheless, the determinants of political support for active measures are complex and a
number of factors are likely to be important. For example, a corporatist-type consensus
between the social partners and the state at a higher political level may be more important for
public support for active measures than the direct involvement of representatives of the social
partners in a tripartite labour market authority, which may in fact be a relatively subordinate
implementation level in the policy chain. 
In the OECD as a whole there is likewise only a loose relationship between these two
modalities of influence of the social partners on active labour market policies (see table 3).
Some countries with a strong corporatist tradition and a consensual style in policy formulation
do not give the social partners a formal role in the tripartite administration of active labour
market policies (Denmark, Finland, Norway), or have only recently experimented with this
institutional form (Netherlands, Austria) while Sweden has recently abandoned tripartism. By
contrast other countries with rather weak corporatist traditions have sometimes established
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18With the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1923-24 (Arbeitsnachweisgesetz of 1922), placement
services and benefit administration were merged in a fully integrated tripartite organization, Reichsanstalt für
Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, in 1927.
tripartite labour administrations (Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, and - until 1990 - the
United Kingdom).
Among the countries examined in our case studies, the strongest corporatist traditions
are found in the Netherlands and Germany and the weakest in France and the United Kingdom.
The system of industrial relations, especially the organization of the trade unions, is most
fragmented and conflict-prone in the latter two countries. Nevertheless, all four countries have
experimented with tripartite forms of participation of the social partners in labour
administrations. Germany is a rare example of a country with a strong corporatist tradition in
industrial relations that has had a tripartite administration since the legal establishment of a
public employment service. 18  In the case of the United Kingdom there was a clear
relationship between the establishment of the tripartite MSC in the early 1970s and
(unsuccessful) efforts to establish a corporatist pattern of policy-coordination between the
government and the social partners. Noteworthy in the case of the United Kingdom is that the
tripartite labour market authority actually survived for 10 years under Thatcher's neo-liberal
policy regime - a fine illustration of the historical momentum of institutions. 
Table 4 provides a simple test of the relative importance of tripartism and corporatism
as influences on the level of active expenditure. It compares average active expenditure as a
percentage of GDP in 1994 for the four categories of policy regimes reported in table 3
classified according to whether a country has tripartite employment service institutions and the
strength of corporatism. The results show that while OECD countries that rank high on the
corporatism indicator also have a markedly higher average level of expenditure for active
measures (1.4 per cent to 0.69  per cent), countries with a tripartite PES self-administration
actually have a lower average level of active expenditure on GDP in comparison with countries
without tripartite employment services (0.91  per cent to 1.03  per cent). These simple
bivariate findings suggest that a corporatist pattern of industrial relations is a stronger
determinant of the level of active expenditure than tripartism. The impact of the social partners
on labour market policy through corporatism is discussed below (3.), where the results of a
quantitative analysis of the impact of corporatism on labour market policy expenditure are
reported.
 
2.5 Multi-actor policy co-ordination
Tripartism in the public employment service, which integrates other policy actors in
PES governance, is also advocated on the basis of a co-operative policy model. In all countries
labour market policies typically involve organizational actors in different functional areas and
levels of government (labour, education, social security institutions; provincial and municipal
governments etc.) as well as employers' organizations, trade unions and other private sector
actors. Thus tripartite institutions in the countries surveyed include not only the social partners
but also other government agencies and levels of government. 
In this view the efficiency and effectiveness of the PES (or the TECs in the United
Kingdom) depend to a large extent on its capacity to interact with these multiple actors at the
national, regional, and local levels. The inclusion of the social partners and other public sector
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organizations in the governance of tripartite labour market institutions can be interpreted as a
strategy of policy co-ordination through co-optation. Inclusion of representatives of these
organizations in PES governance is expected to facilitate necessary co-operation and induce
them to coordinate their own activities better with PES policies. 
In an older and relatively centralized corporatist tradition perhaps best represented by
former Manpower Services Commission (MSC) in the United Kingdom, the primary concern
was the integration of the national and sectoral organizations of the social partners in a new
commitment to active labour market policy. This was still a principal goal of the introduction
of the tripartite labour administration in the Netherlands in the early 1990s. Another related
goal was the improved co-ordination of several government departments concerned with labour
market policy, which are represented the PES's central governing body. 
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19 Until 1997 each group had veto power. Thereafter decision is by simple majority voting, and the government is no longer represented on central board.
20Nomination formally by the government, but it may reject recommendation of the BA's tripartite board only for serious reasons.
21AFPA has more policy discretion in provision of market services, for example, to enterprises. 
22Council regulations require ministerial approval. Moreover, if Council fails to act on suggestions of minister within a fixed period, the changes can be put into effect by the
minister.
23 Since 1997 board required to confer with minister regularly on policy and ministerial oversight has been strengthened.
24Government obligated to fund any deficit that cannot be covered by current revenues and the BA's accumulated surplus. Since 1993 minister may impose budget if disagreement
with the BA and budget is in deficit.
25Muti-year fixed budget allocation foreseen, but in practice government intervened by cutting resources available. Since 1997 dependent on annual budgets.
26For example, TUC advocacy of controls on training quality in the Youth Training Scheme.
Table 2. Synopsis of employment service regimes and their impact on active policies
France Germany The Netherlands The United Kingdom
ANPE AFPA UNEDIC BA Arbeidsvoorziening MSC (1974-1988)
Role of tripartite body in
decision making
Decision-making authority
within legal framework
Decision-making authority
within legal framework
Independent bipartite
council
Decision-making authority
within legal framework
Decision-making authority
within legal framework
Decision-making authority
within legal framework
Do social partners have
majority? 
Yes 2/3 Yes 2/3 Only SP Yes 2/3 Yes 2/3  19 Yes 2/3
Selection of top officials By minister By AFPA subject to
ministerial approval
By UNEDIC By BA Council 20 By national board (CBA) By government
Policies require govt.
approval/ subject to
ministerial direction?
Yes Yes 21 No Yes 22 No 23 Yes
Does PES organization
have budget autonomy?
No
Annual grants with line
item budget
No
Annual grants with line
item budget
Yes
Own budget financed
through contributions to
unemployment insurance
and regular govt. subsidy
Yes
Own budget financed
through contributions to
unemployment ins.
Minister must approve. 24 
Yes
Own budget but subject to
ministerial approval and
annual budget authorization
25
No
Annual grants with line
item budget
Perception of impact of
social partners
Government dominant with
little SP impact
Government dominant with
moderate SP impact
Relatively autonomous SP
organization; bargaining
relationship to govt.
Govt. increasingly
dominant but with
significant administrative
autonomy
Relatively autonomous
labour market authority
(until 1997)
Government dominant. SP
influence on
implementation 26
Source:  See national case studies reported below.
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Table 3: Corporatism and PES tripartism in OECD countries
Corporatism
High Low Total
PES tripartite self-
administration
Austria (since 1994)
Belgium
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands (since 1991)
Canada
France
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
10
PES ministry or other Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden (since 1991)
Australia (since 1997)
Italy
Japan
New Zealand
Spain
Switzerland
UK (since 1990)
USA
12
Total 9 13
Sources:For PES tripartism see table 1. Corporatism ranking based on degree of centralization in wage bargaining
(union density and coverage) from Calmfors and Driffill 1988, High = 1 to 8 in ranking. Luxembourg and
Greece interpolated based on OECD data on union density, coverage, and days lost to due to strikes. Dates
in parentheses refer to introduction or abandonment of tripartism in PES institutions.
By contrast in a new co-operative policy model, which is perhaps most clearly articulated
in the Dutch and British cases, the emphasis is now on decentralized and locally oriented
implementation structures in which the role of the PES is not primarily the administration of
national programmes  but active networking of public and private actors at the regional and
local level. In comparison to the traditional emphasis on the role of the social partners in
tripartism, local policy networks and in particular local authorities are perceived as being
increasingly important actors. This trend is due in particular to the shift in responsibility for
income maintenance and active policies for the unemployed in many countries (e.g. the
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden) toward the local authorities, who are typically responsible for
social assistance for individuals who have exhausted their unemployment benefits. 
One consequence of the new policy model is that it calls into question the traditional
tripartite formula: Should the social partners always be equally represented? Should the social
partners themselves have a majority? Should other societal groups be excluded? For example,
in some innovative implementation regimes such as the Training and Enterprise Councils
(TECs) in the United Kingdom and the JTPA system in the United States local employers have
been given a dominant voice in decentral implementation of labour market policies, and even
Sweden, a country like with strong corporatist traditions, now gives majority control in PES
local boards to the municipalities in order to improve linkages to active measures at the
17
27The withdrawal of employers' organizations from the Swedish labour market board in 1991 triggered these
changes. 
municipal-level. 27 
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Table 4: Average expenditure for ALMP by PES tripartism and strength of corporatism, 22 OECD countries, 1994
 
Corporatism
Total High Low
ALMP%GDP         ALM%GDP per       
                           %  unemployed
  ALMP%GDP    ALMP%GDP per %  unemployed ALMP%GDP ALMP%GD
% unemployed
PES tripartite    0.93   0.13       0.90 0.08         0.91                    0.10
PES ministry or
other    2.00           0.20       0.55 0.06
   
     1.03                    0.11 
   Total Corporatism High
        1.40             0.16
        Total Corporatism Low
          0.69            0.07
  Source: OECD expenditure data and standardized unemployment rates (UR)          
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28UNEDIC financing.
Good process evaluations of whether these goals of enhanced co-ordination are reached
are rare, and we are largely dependent on circumstantial evidence. In countries in which the
oganizations of the social partners are important and willing labour market policy actors, for
example, because of linkages to collective bargaining, to social insurance carriers, or their role
as programme  sponsors, close co-ordination with them is both advisable and necessary.
Participation by the social partners in national and local PES governing bodies is one way to
pursue this goal, which has been institutionalized in many OECD countries. Such contacts
provide the actors involved with information about PES policies and a network of
interoganizational contacts that facilitates co-operation. However the same goal may also be
achieved by participation in advisory bodies to the labour ministry or the PES, which exist in
all countries without tripartite self-administrations. The quality of the contacts and
communication is probably more important for co-ordination than the institutional form. On
the other hand, where the social partners are weak and fragmented or do not play an important
role in labour market policy participation through advisory bodies would appear to be more
appropritate than direct involvement in tripartite institutions.
Inclusion of other policy actors in PES governing bodies is of course only one
possible organizational strategy to improve policy co-ordination. After the evaluation of
tripartite reforms in the Netherlands  it was concluded that co-operation between the PES
and sectoral social insurance carriers and the municipalities was still unsatisfactory, the
incentives for co-operation were changed by allocating part of the PES's funding to these
organizations to use to purchase services from the PES for their clienteles (i.e. especially
the long-term unemployed and social assistance recipients). 
2.6 Internal conflict and deadlock
 A possible negative effect of tripartism is disruption of organizational cohesion and
efficiency and internal conflict that may result from the incorporation of the social partners
(and other actors) in PES governance. The number and diversity of the actors represented may
make decision-making more cumbersome, and in worst cases may result in politicization,
which is the downside risk of the co-operation gain that tripartite forms aim to capture.  This
was a major criticism of the evaluation of the Dutch experiment with tripartism and is evident
in the recent controversies in the German public employment service described above. 
It is noteworthy that conflicts over policy are most often between the government and
the social partners and not between the employer and employee groups within the tripartite
bodies (see table 5). Typically conflicts between the social partners and the government are
related to joint opposition to cuts in funding (Netherlands), or to the extent to which non-
insurance related costs (e.g. special measures in East Germany) are to be financed through the
unemployment insurance funds (in Germany and France). 28 Another common standpoint is
against government interference in the autonomy of the PES organization (France, Germany,
the Netherlands), or opposition to government initiatives to target services restrictively on
problem groups in the Netherlands, or to shift the costs of early retirement or redundancies in
adjustment situations back onto enterprises in Germany. By contrast major differences or
clashes of interest between the social partners on active policies are less important than we had
anticipated. 
In the recent controversy over cutbacks in the German employment service employer
representatives sided with the government not because of any principled opposition to active
20
29The 1996 reform of the Dutch employment service introduced majority voting in response to the recommendation
of the evaluation commission. As the OECD (1996) notes , however, a 2/3 plus 1 decision rule in Austria has apparently
functioned without similar problems.
measures but because of overriding fiscal concerns about the government's deficit and
opposition to financing the measures through increases in taxes or social security contributions.
This is probably a typical policy difference between the social partners in tripartite labour
market policy regimes in countries in which both social partners are committed in principle to
active measures. 
Differences between the social partners are more often in emphasis rather than about
principle: Thus Lechner et al. (1993: 215f) report that employers' organizations in Austria give
greater emphasis to the importance of enterprise-oriented programmes , whereas trade unions
are more concerned about individual measures and programmes  for problem groups. In France
trade union representatives have also been critical of the extent to which active measures take
the form of subsidies to firms without adequate controls for their labour market effects. 
Decision-making rules are an important institutional design feature affecting the
management of tripartite administrations: Whereas the tripartite regime in the Netherlands
initially required unanimity (2/3 of any of the three 'blocks' could veto a decision), a simple
majority suffices in the German employment service. 29 In both the Netherlands and Germany,
conflicts between the government and the social partners in the employment service have led
to changes designed to give the government clear authority to decide any serious controversy
between it and the tripartite governing board of the employment service. The importance of
such procedural rules should not, however, be exaggerated. 
Evidence from experience with tripartite PES organizations suggests that internal
conflicts are not an inherent weakness of these institutions. They are rather a reminder that a
key precondition for the functioning of tripartism is a working policy consensus between
employer, employee, and government representatives. Where this does not (or no longer)
exists, tripartite institutions are inappropriate or at risk; the collapse of tripartism in the United
Kingdom at the end of the 1980s and in Sweden after 1991 are two recent illustrations.
Given its strong tradition of social partnership, the Swedish case is especially interesting
in this respect. The Swedish employers' association's (SAF) 1991 decision to withdraw its
representatives from all the main tripartite organizations, including the national and regional
labour market boards, apparently mainly reflected an ideological sea change in its definition
of its role vis-à-vis government. It now rejected "corporatism," in which "interest
organizations participate in government decision-making or perform government functions."
SAF argued that corporatism weakens democracy and hinders the modernization of public
authorities; in its view government should be responsible for policy and not interest groups,
which should be free to represent their organization and the interests of their members. SAF
endorsed tripartite advisory bodies as an alternative, in which representatives of interest
organizations represent the views of their organizations without assuming responsibility for
governmental policies (SAF 1992; Debois 1997). The Swedish employers' organization was
also apparently frustrated by the fact that its representatives were usually outvoted by the trade
union and government representatives; SAF no longer wished to share responsibility for
decisions it could not prevent because of majority voting rules (Debois 1997; OECD 1996).
After the withdrawal of the SAF representatives, the AMS board structure was reorganized in
1992-93 and now consists of six independent members and a director general appointed by the
government for a fixed term. The social partners now participate in PES governance only as
members of a 12-member bipartite AMS Advisory Council. in which employers' and workers'
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30The "insider" orientation noted here manifests itself as opposition to state efforts to target measures primarily
on problem groups not as opposition to programmes  for these groups. Indeed, in the area of collective agreements the social
partners have shown an increasing interest in promoting the integration of the unemployed, for example, through special
entry wages for unemployed and lower skilled workers in Germany (Bispinck 1997). 
31See Linke (1994) for details. The contribution-based financing system in Germany is an institutional source of
this skewed distribution of access to active measures. 
organizations are equally represented and the AMS director general acts as chairman (Debois
1997; 289). Recently, the government has restructured the regional labour market boards to
give representatives of the municipalities a voting majority. 
2.7 Insider policies 
A classical problem of the devolution of responsibility for government functions to
private actors is that recognized interest groups may not adequately reflect the public interest
or even that of all their members. For example, employers' organization may not adequately
represent the perspective of SMEs or trade unions may not adequately represent the interests
of unorganized workers or of labour market problem groups. There are some indications of
insider policies and interest conflicts along these line in the Netherlands, Germany and the
United Kingdom. In all these countries a principal issue is the extent to which PES active
measures should be targeted on the disadvantaged and problem groups. 30 In the Netherlands,
where this issues has been most prominent, the social partners clearly favor a slip stream
approach according to which the PES can best assist problem groups to find regular
employment if the PES has a good reputation with employers and a high market share in
placements. Adoption of this strategy means that the PES serves a broad segment of the labour
market, including the social partners' own clienteles, whereas the government wishes to focus
PES activities on labour market problem groups. The recent official evaluation of Dutch
tripartite labour market authority actually accuses the representatives of employers and trade
unions of acting "in the interest of their own members" rather than for the common good. A
principal issue during the adoption of the new employment service law in 1995/96 was the
target group orientation of the PES. Whereas the government (Ministry of Social Affairs)
wanted it to focus on the hard-to-place, the social partners rejected this proposal, fearing that
that PES offices would become a dumping ground for social problem groups, and even
threatened to withdraw from the tripartite institutions if such a policy were adopted. The final
compromise categorizes the unemployed according to the amount of training and work
experience needed to place them, ranging from category one workers, who should be able to
find a job on their own, to category four workers who have no chance of finding employment.
The PES is to target its own resources on intermediate groups, i.e. neither the easy to place
nor those who cannot be realistically placed but on those among the long-term unemployed,
women, foreigners, and the partially disabled, for whom placement is possible in combination
with active measures. 
In Germany too targeting of measures has been a problem. The influence of the
"insurance principle" in the tripartite Federal Employment Service, has meant that
unemployment benefit recipients have in practice been given priority access to active measures
(Schmid, Reisssert, Bruche 1994). Until 1994 a very high percentage of individuals in training
programmes  were previously employed and the probability of entering labour market training
was lowest for the long-term unemployed. The recent initiative in Germany to target training
on the unemployed came from the government. 31 
In the United Kingdom it was initially feared, for example, that devolution of
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responsibility for active measures to the employer-led TECs would entail a shift in public
training away from the reintegration of problem groups toward serving the skill needs of the
private business sector (Meager 1991). Although the TECs are - given the interests of their
employer-led boards and their broad mandate - more inclined to invest additional resources in
training for the employed, or for the readily employable, in order to to meet skill shortages
rather than to provide training for problem groups, this has not taken place because relatively
strict eligibility criteria for training programmes  are defined by the ministry and not by the
TECs (Mosley and Degen 1994). The extraordinary focus of labour market policy in the
United Kingdom on problem groups, particularly youth and the long-term unemployed (>6
months), is of long standing and has been unaffected by the heightened influence of employers
on the implementation of active measures. 
Although a realistic analysis has to be cognizant of the fact that the social partners are
interest organizations, albeit with very broad rather than narrow constituencies, experience
with tripartite organizations reported in the case studies shows the importance in this respect
of the mediating role of government as a representative of the public interest in the functioning
of tripartite institutions. Moreover, the likelihood of insider policies is clearly related to the
characteristics of the organizations of the social partners. Where employers' organizations and
trade unions are broadly based and inclusive with a high level of coverage, the problem of
insider policies is probably not very great. Where, on the other hand, the organizations of the
social partners are weak and fragmented, the danger that they may pursue particularistic
interests appears correspondingly greater.
 
3. Corporatism and active policies
Classical neo-corporatist forms of policy co-ordination in the 1960s and early 1970s
focused on economic and incomes policies, but social and labour market policies also played
an important if auxiliary role. For example, the Swedish original commitment to active labour
market policies in the 1960s was an element of a broader consensus on economic and social
policy (Rothstein 1996). 
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Table 5: Types of conflicts in employment service regimes: France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
ANP AFPA UNEDIC BA Arbeidsvoorziening
1991-96 
MSC 1974-1988
Examples of
conflicts between
social partners in
tripartite/bipartite
organization
Unions stress mission of serving
unemployed and low-skilled & criticize
employer and market orientation
1) Conflicts over
presidency of 
organization
2) Over activating
benefits: Employers
favored activation
whereas unions
wanted only
insurance benefit
function
1) Conflicts over
level of budget for
active programmes 
- unions opposed
cuts
2) Conflict over
legalization of
commercial
placement services
1) Union
opposition to
'workfare,'
2) Removal of
employment service
from tripartite MSC
Examples of
conflicts between
social partners in
tripartite/bipartite
organizations and
government
1) Conflict over
financing of non-
insurance
(solidarity) benefits; 
2) Over state
intervention in
UNEDIC
1) Financing of
non-insurance
related expenditure
(e.g. for Eastern
Germany);
2) Severance
payments offset
unemployment
benefit
1)Opposition to: a)
government budget
cuts; b) interference
in operations of
labour market
authority;
2) Advocacy of
"slip stream"
strategy as opposed
to problem-group
orientation
Sources: See national case studies reported in Part II below
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For a variety of reasons the era of corporatist attempts at co-ordination of economic
policies at the macro-level has passed. A number of reasons can be cited for this turnabout: (1)
National income policies negotiated between the social partners in neo-corporatist policy
regimes arose in the context of tight labour markets in which the co-operation of the trade
unions was needed in order to avoid inflationary disruption of macro-economic policies in
economies at or near full-employment. Today the position of unions has been greatly weakened
by structural changes toward a service economy and high levels of unemployment. The need
for corporatist forms of co-operation with trade unions in order to enforce wage moderation
is not as great as in the past, but there is now a greater  need for co-operation in the process
of structural adjustment. (2) Moreover, the internationalization of product markets and the
increasing exposure of formerly protected sectors to competition (public sector, service sector)
has reduced the policy room for maneuver for any type of centralized bargaining at the national
level (Traxler 1993). (3) Finally, in an increasingly integrated European and world market, the
room for maneuver for national economic policies appears to be more limited than in the past
(Marks et al. 1997; Traxler 1993). There are, nevertheless, still marked differences across
OECD countries in the organizational strength and political influence of the social partners and
in the respective national styles of political co-ordination and collective bargaining (see tables
1-3 in the Appendix below). Moreover, new phenomenon such as the "social pacts," which
have been a widespread response to the labour market crisis in Western countries, may be
interpreted as being a softer, contemporary form of corporatist co-ordination (IRES 1994).
This section summarizes the main findings of an empirical analysis of the impact of
corporatism on labour market policy expenditure in OECD countries, "Corporatism and Active
Labour Market Policy: Empirical Evidence from OECD Data," which is reported in detail in
the statistical appendix below. In most industrialized countries, the system of industrial
relations plays an important role for economic and labour market performance (cf. Janoski
1997). The actors in industrial relations, "the social partners", constitute a "web of rules"
(OECD 1994: 167), providing procedures for conflict management. We hypothesize that the
characteristics of the industrial relations system and the integration of social partners in the
policy process have an impact on the level and composition of active measures. The influence
of the social partners on level and design of labour market policy expenditure is examined in
different multiple linear regression models (see table 1-1 in statistical appendix below). Our
models test the influence of social partners within an institutional model that also takes into
account the level of unemployment and party constellations in the political system. Two
different indicators for the role of the social partners are used: union density and consensus
orientation. 
The dependent variables in our models are expenditure rates for passive and active labour
market policy as a percentage of GDP (with the subgroups training and subsidised employment
for active policies) as well as the overall "activity rate" of labour market policy, i.e. the share
of active measures on all labour market policy expenditure. 
The models are tested for two periods: 1985 to 1990 and 1991 to 1994. Cyclical and
extraordinary peaks in the data set are smoothed by taking an average of the unionization and
conflict indicators for the last five years. The analysis is based on the data collected by the
OECD, enabling on the one hand a cross-national comparison between different national
institutional regimes, and, on the other hand, a sample that is large enough for statistical
analysis. The OECD data refer to national data sources, that are adjusted according to
international standards as far as it is possible.
The results of our analysis, which are reported in detail in the statistical appendix below,
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can be interpreted as providing robust evidence for a positive relationship between corporatism
as measured by union density and low strike rates on both total and passive expenditure for
labour market policy as a percentage of GDP. If we interpret corporatism in this sense as a
proxy for social partnership, we can conclude that labour market policy expenditure is
significantly higher in countries in which social partnership is stronger. On the other hand, the
evidence for an impact of social partnership on levels of active expenditure (here training and
subsidized employment) is weaker and inconsistent. Finally, as expected, the unemployment
rate is strongly and significantly positively related to both active and passive labour market
expenditure. Neither social partnership nor any of the other variables included in the model are
statistically significant when regressed on activity rates, i.e. the ratio of active to passive
measures in labour market policy expenditure. 
4. Conclusion
There are a variety of different roles open to the social partners in the design and
implementation of active labour market policies. In this report, we have identified and
examined four principal channels of influence: (1) political influence on government policy,
especially in corporatist policy regimes; 2) tripartism in employment services, 3) collective
bargaining; 4) programme  participation. We have focused in particular on the first two, which
represent forms of direct involvement of the social partners in policy making. Although both
of these channels of influence are still important in a great many OECD countries, both appear
for a variety of reasons to be less important than in the past. Corporatist forms of policy co-
ordination, in which the social partners have historically played a central role, have been
weakened in particular by globalization of economic relations, which has clearly reduced the
room for maneuver for national policy, and by a secular decline in trade union power. The
independence of tripartite employment service institutions, and hence the influence of the social
partners within them, has also been curtailed by increased government intervention due in
particular to growing fiscal constraints. 
Direct involvement of the social partners in the governance of independent tripartite
labour market authorities like that found in all four of the case study countries (France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and until 1988 in the United Kingdom) appears at first sight to
promise the greatest influence on active policies. Our case studies show, however, that such
formal responsibility does not necessarily mean real influence. Tripartite employment service
institutions are more concerned with the implementation of policies, whose broad parameters
are clearly set by government, although there are large differences across countries in the
degree of autonomy actually exercised by tripartite institutions. This finding suggests that the
distinction between tripartite PES governance and PES advisory bodies, in which the social
partners merely play a consultative role, may not be very great in practice. In general it appears
that the form of participation is less important than the existence of a culture of social dialogue
in the political system and in industrial relations. It is thus not surprising that a simple
comparison of expenditure levels in different types of employment service regimes shows no
evidence for higher levels of expenditure for active measures in OECD countries with tripartite
governance structures in comparison with those in which the social partners have merely an
advisory function but strong evidence for higher expenditure levels in countries with strong
corporatist traditions in their industrial relations systems. However, a multivariate regression
analysis of the impact of social partnership as measured by union density and low strike rates
on labour market policy found a positive impact on total and on passive expenditure but only
weaker evidence for a positive impact on expenditure for active measures. 
While involvement of the social partners in policy making and implementation is clearly
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desirable, it is difficult to draw general policy conclusions for the institutional design of
employment service institutions based on our limited study of the experience of four western
European states. As noted above, a culture of social partnership in labour market policy
appears to be more important than the particular institutional form. Such a policy culture of
social partnership is not, however, a matter of simple choice but deeply rooted in a national
culture. Moreover, social partnership has certain prerequisites the most important of which are
that trade unions and employers' organizations be broadly based and representative and that
they share a basic policy consensus with government on active measures and on the appropriate
role of the social partners in policy-making.  These are important conditions for tripartite
employment service institutions if they are to function effectively (legitimation, multi-actor
policy coordination) and to avoid a number of possible negative effects (internal conflict,
insider policies). The evidence from our case studies clearly indicates that, if these conditions
are  fulfilled, tripartite participation of the social partners in the governance of the employment
service is more likely to succeed and that  under other circumstances participation through
consultative bodies (i.e. without  direct responsibility for PES management) may be more
appropriate.   
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32 It succeeded the Economic Council (Constitution of the 27th October 1946), which in turn, is derived from the
National Economic Council (decree of the 16th January 1925; law of the 19th March 1936) .
II. Case studies: The role of the social partners in France, Germany,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
1. France
1.1 Introduction
 The most important features of the French industrial relations system are the weakness
and pluralism of trade unions, the fragmentation of collective bargaining, the plurality of
negotiating levels, and the importance of the state in conflict arbitration. France has a long
tradition of state intervention and the social partners have not been able to develop their own
autonomous sphere of collective regulation. 
The political and ideological fragmentation of the system of industrial relations, especially
on the trade union side, has not been offset in France by the development of corporatist forms
of co-ordination as was the case, for example, in the Netherlands. Rather industrial relations
in France are characterized by a high degree of conflict and the lack of a consensual approach,
which is manifest inter alia in high strike rates. The relative strength of the Communist left in
the trade union movement and politics is undoubtedly an important reason for this conflictual
style. 
The principal trade union confederations are CFDT (Confédération française et
démocratique du travail), CGT (Confédération générale du travail), CGT-FO (Confédération
générale du travail - Force ouvrière), often abbreviated FO, CFTC (Confédération française
des travailleurs chrétiens) and CGC (Confédération générale des cadres), the latter being the
French managerial staff union. In contrast to the variety of trade union organizations, which
are fragmented into rival religious and ideological confederations, there is only one significant
employers' association at the national level: the CNPF (Conseil national du patronat français).
It negotiates on major issues related to working conditions, but is not involved in wage
bargaining, which is the concern of the sectoral level confederations. There is also an
association which represents small and medium-sized companies, the CGPME (Confédération
générale des petites et moyennes entreprises). Approximately 90% of French companies are
affiliated with the CNPF and its sectoral organizations. The CNPF addresses general social and
economic issues relevant to business on the national level as well as employment-related issues.
The CNPF comprises 83 sectoral employers' associations of various types in manufacturing,
commerce and services, as well as 163 regional associations at the departmental or local level.
Although corporatist institutions for policy co-ordination have never developed in France
to the same extent as, for example, in Austria, Sweden, or the Netherlands, two high-level
institutions in the industrial relations system should be mentioned before discussing institutional
channels more directly related to active policies: the "Conseil économique et social" (CES) and
the "Commisariat Général au Plan" (CGP). The CES, that is the Economic and Social Council,
was established in 1958 (Constitution of the 4th October 1958; decree of the 29th December
1958). 32 The CES was established to serve three purposes: to be a consultative body to
government, providing it with independent advice on a variety of issues; to give interest groups
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33In addition to these 231 advisors there are 72 "section members" appointed for two years and having an expert's
role in the section which receives them (the CES is divided in several sections, each one treating different topics).
34 It should be noted that this figure here and for other trade union organizations merely reflects the distribution
of votes in the principal consultative body at the plant level and  not union density, which in France is very low. 
the opportunity to participate in a public policy forum and to express 
their opinions to the government; and to provide a forum for the development of a consensus
on important national issues. The CES includes 231 members divided up into 18 groups and
serving for five years. The appointment procedures of these advisers differs: 163 among them
are appointed by socio-professional groups, and 68 others are appointed by the government. 33
According to the officials interviewed, the CES concerns itself with so many aspects of social
and economic life, that it cannot be regarded as a consultative body to the government on active
labour market policy. However the government may ask the CES to give its opinion on a
specific subject when preparing a law, and the CES sometimes offers its advice. 
Employers' Associations
C CNPF Conseil national du patronat français (National Council of French Employers). Ca.
90 per cent of French companies are affiliated with the CNPF. 
C CGPME Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises (General
Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Companies).
Trade Union Confederations 
C CFDT Confédération française démocratique du travail (French Democratic Confederation
of Labour). Socialist orientation with ca 500,000 members, it receives about 20 per cent
to 25 per cent of votes in works council elections. 34 Participates in all national negotiations
and is represented in all important consultative bodies.
C CGT Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour). Communist
orientation with ca. 1 million members, it receives 25 per cent to 30 per cent of votes in
works council elections.
C CGT-FO Confédération générale du travail - Force ouvrière (Workers' Force). Reformist-
socialist orientation with ca. 1 million members it receives 10 per cent to 15 per cent of
votes in works council elections. 
C CFTC Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian
Workers). Ca. 250.000 members, this Christian-reformist union receives about 3 per cent
to 5 per cent of votes in works council elections.
C CGC Confédération générale des cadres (General Confederation of Executive Staffs). Circa
180,000 managerial personnel. Participates in national negotiations and negotiations at firm
level. Represented in various consultative organizations. 
The CGP, the General Planning Commission, was established in 1946 by a government
seeking to bridge divided interests for the task of post-war reconstruction. It was conceived as
a way of providing permanent and systematic reflection on the problems and prospects of the
economy with a view to action; its role was to advise the government in the drawing up of
plans (long-term policy presentations). Indeed, several Plans have been set up with the
participation of CGP (and its commissions). Today, CGP no longer has this role; it is still a
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35 Centralized "planification" lost much of its sense after the state began a decentralization process  that gives the
regions more autonomy.
36 The French case is quite special and opinions differ about the degree of corporatism. For example, Tixier (1995)
shows that three different forms of corporatism coexist (micro, neo and industry corporatism) whilst Duclos and Mériaux
(1995) are of the opinion that there is an homology between neo-corporatism and bipartism (the latter being the French
version of neo-corporatism). Ires (1996), on the other side, stresses the originality of French corporatism compared to other
industrial countries: In France the social partners have no autonomous sphere of social regulation; bipartism must therefore
be regarded as small islands (of autonomy) periodically subjected to state intervention.
37 FNE (Fonds national de l'emploi) was created by the law of the 18th December 1963. It is not a body with legal
status but a budget fund at the disposal of the employment minister. FNE aids are granted through contracts negotiated
between the employer and the administration.
forum for discussion but no longer directly linked to policy. 35 
In general the social partners have three institutional channels for influencing the design
and implementation of active labour market policy measures (apart from their participation in
the general political process). The first way is so-called "tripartism", by which is meant
institutions involving both the state and social partners, especially the public employment
service and related institutions. The second way, "bipartism," is quite similar to "tripartism"
with the only difference being that only representatives of labour and management are involved
in the institutions. Collective agreements, the third way, represent the traditional sphere of
labour regulation carried out by the social partners.  Of these different channels,  bipartism is
the most  distinctive  French pattern and  usually interpreted in  relation to “neo-
corporatism.” 36
Several forms of bipartism exist. According to Ires (1996) there are two types of
bipartism: First, a "pure" bipartism based on collective agreements. The institutions of pure
bipartism are characterized by decision-making by labour and management with only a
subsidiary role for the state. The second form of bipartism corresponds roughly to the
participation of social partners in state management; in other words, it is constituted by
institutions established by law in which all important decisions are made by the state
(government, administration and recently parliament). 
1.2 Tripartism in the public employment service 
The main institutions of the public employment service were established in the period
between the end of World War II and the early 1970s. The institutions in question are ANPE
(French National Employment Office), AFPA (Adult Professional Education Association),
UNEDIC (National Union for Industrial and Commercial Employment), FNE (French National
Employment Fund) 37 and the labour ministry (organized at different levels) and the inter-
departmental structures. The most important tripartite institutions related to active labour
market policy are discussed in this section: ANPE, the national placement office, AFPA, the
national vocational training association, various committees involved in employment policy and
vocational training. UNEDIC, the bipartite self-administration of the French unemployment
insurance system, is discussed in the following section. In addition to the tripartite or bipartite
organizations described here, the labour ministry is also a major actor in the delivery of active
measures.
"Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi" (ANPE)
ANPE is the national employment office and the central organization of the public
placement service. Established in 1967, it is a national public body with an independent legal
status but under the authority of the labour minister. The ANPE has two principal missions.
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38 The ANPE's board of management consists of an appointed chairman; 5 members representing employers; 5
members representing workers; 5 members representing, respectively, the Ministers of Employment, Education, Finance,
Industry and the Minister responsible for the local authorities.
39 Trade unions recognized by law and the most important employers' organizations. 
40 "Déconcentration" means about the same as decentralization, but decentralization is used for the political
structure whereas "déconcentration" is used for the state administration.
First, it has to assist people seeking employment, training or professional counseling. At the
same time, it has to assist employers in recruiting personnel.
The ANPE is governed by a board headed by a Director-General, who is appointed by
the minister of labour. In 1980 a tripartite board of management was introduced in which
ANPE's users are represented. By law the board of management deliberates on ANPE's general
strategies and development plans, cooperation agreements at the national level, in particular
with UNIDEC, the bipartite organization that administers the unemployment benefit system
(see below), and its budget. Tripartite regional and departmental committees were introduced
in 1986. 38 The representatives of the employers and workers are appointed by the most
representative employers' and workers' organizations. 39
Despite its formally autonomous status, the ANPE and its governing board have basically
very little independence vis-à-vis the state (Hamoniaux, 1995). Its principal officials (the
president of the board of directors and the managing director) are appointed by the labour
minister, and the decisions of its governing board are enforceable only if approved by the
minister; and finally, its personnel is subject to civil service status. Its financial autonomy is
even more limited: 70 per cent of his budget comes from a direct state grant and the rest from
the Fonds National de l'Emploi. 
Recently, the state has started a devolution (déconcentation) process in the placement
service 40: the government decree of the 20th December 1986 widens the number of
organizations with which it co-operates but ANPE maintains management and control. The idea
of partnership has been further developed in two multi-year operating agreements signed in
1990 and 1994 between ANPE and the state called "progress contracts" (contrats de progrès),
which establish a link between state provision of financial resources and ANPE results. 
The representatives of the social partners interviewed (members of the board of directors)
were skeptical about their impact on active labour market policy through their participation in
ANPE because of their limited influence within the organization and because the organization
itself is largely subordinate to the state. Employers' representatives regard the acceptance by
ANPE of the idea that enterprises as well as the unemployed are its clients as their most
important success, while most union representatives regard their participation within ANPE as
having little real impact.
"Association Nationale pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes" (AFPA)
AFPA, the National Association for Adult Vocational Training, which was established
in 1966, is one of the key components of the public employment service. AFPA is principally
a training center. About 40 per cent of training for the unemployed is carried out in its centers.
It is an association under control (sous tutelle) of the state, which means that its policies are
fixed by the labour minister, and nearly 70 per cent of its resources comes from public sources
The AFPA has a tripartite governance structure. Its General Assembly, in which the
ministries concerned, the employers' associations and the most representative trade union
organizations are represented, is in principal responsible for all issues relating to the
administration and functioning of the AFPA. The Assembly elects from its members a tripartite
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41 AFPA has technical tripartite advisory bodies that are organized at the industrial level, the so called
"Commission professionnelles consultatives" (CPC; Advisory professional commission). The CPC is involved in the
elaboration of occupational profiles degrees and is consulted by the minister of employment, in order to define vocational
training policies.
42 It implies three basic changes: First, the redefinition of relations between the state and AFPA based on the
principle of control a posteriori; i.e. management by results; second, the modernization of the AFPA (e.g. diversification
of training, productivity improvement); third, development of partnerships with regional and local actors.
43 For a general overview of the evolution of CBE, see Comité de liaison des comités de bassin d'emploi, 1991.
managing committee, and it also appoints the president, who is responsible for implementing
the committee's decisions and for the conduct of day-to-day business, and a director, whose
appointment is subject to the approval of the Minister of Labour. 41 
A reform of AFPA that began in the early 1990s rests essentially on two contracts: the
"objectives contract" (contrats d'objectifs) and the "progress contract" (contrat de progrès). The
objectives contract signed in March 1991 fixed the plans of AFPA for 1991, 1992, 1993. The
basic idea of this contract was to improve the management, to reinforce the autonomy of the
organization, and to pursue the devolution (deconcentration) of the association. In contrast to
the general principles affirmed in the "objectives" contract, the progress contract gives a
precise answer concerning the mission and the organization of AFPA. 42
The social partners seem to have more influence in AFPA than in ANPE. This is
probably due to their generally greater influence in the domain of vocational training.
However, AFPA remains an instrument of the government: It has a public service mission and
has to follow public employment policies. 
Committees for employment and vocational training: CSE, COREF and CODEF, "Comités
(locaux) de bassin de l'emploi" (CBE)
The "Comité Supérieur de l'Emploi (CSE), the "Comité Régional de la Formation
Professionnelle, de la Promotion Sociale et de l'Emploi (COREF)" and the "Comité
Départemental de la Formation Professionnelle, de la Promotion sociale et de l'emploi
(CODEF) have similar roles, which they exercise respectively at the national, regional and
departmental levels. Their composition is tripartite with a more or less equal number of labour,
management and state representatives. Their original mission was to consult on local
implementation of employment and vocational training policies. According to experts
interviewed, their effective role is quite limited: They mostly deal with the examination of
adjustment-related subsidies to firms financed by the FNE, usually when enterprises face mass
dismissals. Conflicts arise in the meetings as a rule when unions do not agree with the necessity
of dismissals and disapprove the financial support of the state, which they regard as
encouraging lay-offs. 
The "comités locaux de l'emploi" (CBE, local employment committees) were established
by law in 1982 and reformed in 1993. 43 At this occasion their name was changed; now, they
are called "comités de bassin de l'emploi" (labour pool committees). These committees are
composed of local councilors, company managers and workers' representatives. Their primary
functions is to serve as an advisory body for the prefect and to act as an intermediary for
governmental employment and training measures and to promote local employment policies
The coordination of the activities of the different CBE is ensured by a national "comité de
liaison des comités de bassi d'emploi" (CLCBE; liason committee). According to experts
interviewed, CBE essentially helps local associations and employers by giving information and
forming working groups. It is an arena of communication and discussion but not of policy-
making. 
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44 Assedic (Associations pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce) - Association for industrial and commercial
employment - is comparable to Unedic. Unedic is organized at the national level, whereas Assedic is organized at territorial
level and has to join Unedic.
In most cases, the tripartite institutions discussed above are not involved in general policy
orientation, but rather in the implementation of established measures. In short, the social
partners don't have any role in the design but at the very most some influence on the
implementation of active measures. With regard to the degree of influence it should be stressed
that social partners only have a consultative role, and never decision-making power. The social
partners themselves, at least those interviewed, seem to give little importance to these
institutions. In their opinion, this channel provides them with very little influence. In their view
the institutions of tripartism largely instrumentalize the participation of the social partners for
policies made by state authorities (governments)
1.3 Bipartism in the unemployment benefit system 
This section reviews the most important bipartite institution with an influence on active
labour market policy: the unemployment benefit system (UNEDIC), which has recently
developed a programme  of activating passive expenditure. The role of the social partners in
the vocational training system, which is an important area of activity in France as well as in
most other countries, has been analyzed elsewhere in detail (Streeck et al. 1990) and is not
discussed here. 
The "Union Nationale d'Emploi dans l'Industrie et le Commerce" (UNEDIC) is a non-
profit association established in 1958 by interprofessional agreement, i.e. by the social
partners. Because the unemployment insurance system originates from an agreement between
the social partners, its decision-making bodies are bipartite structures. UNEDIC is governed
by a bipartite council which every two years appoints a managing board from among its
members. Its chairman is alternately a representative of the employers' associations and a union
representative. The managing board has the task of managing the day-to-day operation of
UNEDIC. 44 From a formal point of view, UNEDIC corresponds exactly to the description of
pure bipartism. Yet, the real role of social partners in the unemployment system functioning
is more ambiguous, as the state continuously intervenes in its activities. 
Before analyzing the real role of social partners in the system, it should be noted that
UNEDIC's role in active labour market policy has recently increased. In fact, since 1986
UNEDIC has been developing a programme  of activating passive benefits. In particular, four
schemes were introduced to promote employment: the "Convention de conversion" (retraining
contract), initiated by the inter-professional agreement of the 20th October 1989, the
"Allocation Formation-Reclassement" - AFR (training/career change benefit), introduced by
the inter-professional agreement of the 6th July 1988, the "Convention de coopération"
(cooperation contract), initiated by the inter-professional agreement of the 8th June 1994 and
the "Allocation de Remplacement pour l'Emploi" - ARPE (job replacement benefit), introduced
by the inter-professional agreement of the 6th September 1995. The latter agreement also
provided for creation of a Bipartite Fund to Promote Employment, the "Fond Paritaire
d'intervention en faveur de l'Emploi" (FPE).
The first two schemes fall into the category of retraining and have been implemented with
a strong state participation. The retraining contract scheme was made compulsory by the law
the 2nd August 1989 (companies must offer all employees affected by a redundancy programme
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45It should be noted that UNEDIC has allowed ANPE to implement this measure, i.e. to organize the training;
the measure is thus bipartite in origin but implemented by a tripartite institution. 
46 Some statistics: In 1996, about 100 000 people joined a scheme of early withdrawal from employment: 45 277
persons benefited from the public early retirement programmes  (ASFNE and PRP) and 52 211 from the ARPE. According
to the analysis, the drop in programme  entrants in 1996 compared to 1995 (- 10,4 per cent) - particularly striking as far
as the PRP is concerned, since entries in this scheme had been constantly increasing before - can be explained (besides the
evolution of budget allocation) by the increasing competition of ARPE (18.7 per cent more entries in 1996 than in 1995).
At the end of December 1996, 232 637 persons were getting an early retirement indemnity: 128 442 on a ASFNE basis,
54 672 on a PRP basis and 49 523 on a ARPE basis. The 31st August 1997, ARPE had 63 479 beneficiaries and 70 447
replacement new hires had been realized. Uptake of the cooperation contracts has resulted in 30 000 hires since it came into
force (until the end of August 1997). See CNPF 1997.
47 It should be noted, however, that most active measures are still carried out by the state. For a detailed
description of these UNEDIC measures, see Ginest 1997.
48 By unifying it within the contractual regime administered by the social partners with a state subsidy. 
the possibility of signing a retraining contract) and is co-financed by the state. 45 The AFR was
set up with the direct intervention of the state, which is, moreover, the principal sponsor. On
the other hand, the last two schemes mark the determination of the social partners to strengthen
their own action to promote employment. ARPE competes with two other early retirement
programmes  financed by the FNE. 46
These measures are really important, as they mark the first step in the development of
the social partners' own employment policy. In particular ARPE is considered as resulting from
an "historic" agreement. All experts interviewed agreed that ARPE is the most important
measure in years with respect to the influence of social partners on active labour market policy.
The employers' association CNPF even makes a (partially prospective) comparison between
UNEDIC and ANPE: they are the respective employment policy instruments of the social
partners and the state. 47
Relations between the state and the social partners in UNEDIC
The relationship between the social partners and the state (with regard to UNEDIC) can
be outlined in four stages (Ires, 1996, p. 97-101). Since 1958, the unemployment benefit
system had consisted of two pillars: public assistance and the contractual bipartite insurance
system (UNEDIC). Faced with increasing unemployment, conflicts emerged at the end of the
1970's. On one hand, the state criticized UNEDIC's benefit structure for giving unequal
benefits to different categories of the unemployed and for being too complicated. On the other
hand, the social partners blamed the state for the financial problems of the system (cutbacks
in the state subsidy and in some case overly generous benefits). As a result, the system was
reformed in 1979. 48 At the beginning of the 1980's a new conflict arose over financial
problems due to the rise in unemployment, the expansion of early retirement measures, high
benefit levels, and the failure of the state to adhere to the 1979 agreement. The social partners
opened negotiations in June 1982 but broke them off in October because of a disagreement
about the necessary savings. Unlike the unions, the employers' associations (CNPF and
CGPME) opposed an increase in benefits and proposed major savings. In November 1982
CNPF canceled the contract of 1979 and proposed setting up a new unemployment benefit
system. The government intervened to regulate "exceptionally and provisionally the functioning
of the system" (decree of 24th November 1982). This decree altered neither the nature of the
system nor the functioning of the bipartite institutions, but reformed the benefits (reducing their
length) and the early retirement measures (restricting access). Following this crisis, negotiations
started again. The CNPF proposed separating unemployment insurance, managed only by the
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49 It is important to note that there is a sort of competition between the different negotiation levels, as no
restrictions exist, except for a hierarchical principle. According to this principle, agreements concluded at a lower level
have to be at least as favorable (to employees) as agreements concluded at superior levels. (In recent years, exceptions have
been increasingly permitted.).
social partners and financed by contributions, and the solidarity (new term for assistance),
which was to become a state responsibility financed by taxes. But CFDT and CGT refused to
sign the written agreement. The state entered directly into negotiations, and an agreement
signed by all employers and employees federations was reached. It established the principle of
the separation between insurance and solidarity. The state was now made completely
responsible for some types of benefits: early retirement, training stipends (vocational training)
and aid for enterprise creation by the unemployed. The period between 1984 and 1991 is
characterized by a relative stabilization of the system, even though successive negotiations
changed both the conditions of benefits and the system financing. Despite the new division of
responsibility in the system, the state continued to intervene. For example, it directly
participated in the setting up of the training/career change benefits (Allocation de Fromation
Reclassement) and financed these measures for the most part.
Because UNEDIC has continued to experience financial problems since 1992, several
modifications have been decided. Two agreements are particularly important: the agreement
of the 18th July 1992, which tightens benefit conditions, and the tripartite agreement of 23rd
July 1993, which aims at restoring the fiscal soundness of the system. In the latter agreement,
the state committed itself to paying a subsidy, and the social partners committed themselves
neither to lower the contribution rate nor to increase benefits. A tripartite supervisory council
was also established, the "Conseil d'Orientation et de Surveillance" (COS), which is
responsible for the auditing of UNEDIC's accounts as well as for co-ordination and control
measures. 
This review of the most important stages of UNEDIC's evolution shows the ambiguity
of the relationship between the social partners and the state: The latter seems to encourage and
support the bipartite system, though it constantly intervenes. In crisis situations conflicts
between the state and the social partners typically relate to their respective roles in financing
the system. By contrast other conflicts are mainly linked to state interventions in UNEDIC
policies related to employment policies. Conflicts among social partners exist, too. For
example, there is a traditional conflict over the mission of UNIDEC: Should it provide a pure
insurance scheme or also engage in employment policies? Power conflicts between unions for
the presidency are also common (usually between FO and CFDT).
It should be stressed that UNEDIC is at the heart of active labour market policy because
public employment policy and unemployment benefits have been traditionally closely linked.
Furthermore, and it might be the most important point, UNEDIC has recently developed an
employment promotion policy through the activation of passive benefits. Yet, UNIDEC's real
influence must be relativized. UNEDIC's sphere of bipartism (toward the state) has been
constantly re-defined. The recent events go both in the direction of more autonomy (activating
benefits programmes ) and less autonomy (institution of a tripartite council in 1993), but
history seems to give more evidence in favor of state intervention, so that one could speak of
"bipartism under control" (Ires 1996: 21). 
1.4 Collective agreements and active policies
As a rule the social partners can make collective agreements at three levels: the national
inter-professional, the industry, and the enterprise (plant) levels. 49 Since 1980 the state has
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50It should be noted that there have also been important national and industry collective agreements on training
for the employed and youth measures that are not discussed here. 
51 For an overview of working-time policy since 1980, see Freyssinet (1997).
been encouraging collective agreements. In particular, the Auroux laws have stimulated
collective agreements (the number of collective agreements has been constantly rising since
then) by introducing several negotiation obligations: at the industry level, an annual negotiation
over minimum wages and periodic (every 5 years) negotiations over wage structures and
training; at the plant level, an annual obligation to negotiate over wages and working-time. In
this section we do not discuss agreements at national and industrial level, since the most
important ones (with respect to public employment policy) have been integrated in the
discussion of UNEDIC. 50 We will however discuss the plant level and working time
reductions.
The number of local agreements on employment has been constantly increasing since the
beginning of the 1990s (2.6 per cent of all plant agreement in 1990 and 9.6 per cent in 1996.
Wages and working time are the two most negotiated subjects, with the latter recently
increasing in importance. In 1990 57.9 per cent of the agreements were on wages and 38.2 per
cent on working time, whereas the respective proportion were 41.8 per cent and 43.1 per cent
in 1996). 51Since 1982 the state has been stimulating collective agreements on working-time
(reduction and organization) especially at the enterprise level. The most important working-
time measures were the introduction of 39-hour work week (decree of the 16th January 1982),
the establishment of an annual obligation of negotiating working time at enterprise level (Aroux
law of the 13th November 1982) as well as the establishment of several possibilities not to
comply with the labour laws (or with norms fixed by collective agreements at a superior level),
a mechanism which is called in French "dérogation". In particular the possibility of varying
weekly working-time over the year was encouraged by different laws (law of the 28th February
1986; law of the 22 June 1987; Five-Year Law of 1993). The special characteristic of these
"dérogations" is that they must be decided through collective agreement (in most cases an
enterprise agreement is sufficient). In June 1996 a working-time reduction law was passed
(called "loi Robien") which is particularly interesting because it makes an employment policy
subsidy to an enterprise subject to the conclusion of a prior collective agreement. In short, each
enterprise reducing working-time and hiring people at the same time (or avoiding dismissals)
is partially exempted from social security contributions (different modalities are allowed). The
enterprise has to conclude an agreement with unions, in order to sign the contact with the state.
All these legal measures can be regarded as having two aims: first encouraging collective
agreements in order to delegate some labour regulation and second, having an impact on
employment both through work sharing and through better adaptation of labour use to the
market situation (working-time flexibility). Although the impact of these working-time
measures on employment is controversial, they have increasingly been the subject of regulation
through collective agreements.
By way of conclusion, we will present some general remarks on collective agreements.
First of all, the interplay between laws and inter-professional agreements works in the two
ways: Sometimes, the social partners conclude an agreement that inspires subsequent
legislation, while at other times legislation imposes a rule which is then adapted to concrete
situations by the social partners through collective agreement (this is mostly the case when
social partners cannot manage to find an agreement). Nevertheless, even though the state
formally encourages collective agreements, i.e. joint decisions by the social partners, historical
experience suggests that as a rule it regards employer as the only legitimate partner for
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employment decisions; most employment subsidies result from a contract between the state
administration and the employer and seldom require a plant agreement, i.e. approval by trade
unions. Finally, two phenomena should be stressed, with regard to the specific role of social
partners in employment policy: on one hand, active labour market policy measures are mostly
decided by the state and only in a second stage applied in the firm (with different degrees of
involvement of the social partners); on the other hand, even if the social partners have recently
shown a willingness to strengthen their own actions to promote employment (and hence to take
a partial responsibility for the employment situation), structural and cultural problems still
hamper the collective bargaining process.
2. Germany
2.1  Introduction
The German social partners are highly organized and relatively centralized pillars of the
industrial relations system with a recognized and firmly established role in other social and
political institutions. German industrial relations have a strong tradition of autonomous
collective bargaining and successful co-operation at the national, industry and plant level, with
a corresponding relatively low level of industrial conflict. Although Germany has never
developed the type of centralized corporatist forms of co-ordination found, at least in the past,
in the Netherlands and Austria, the social partners are highly integrated in the social and
political decision-making process through consultative procedures and direct participation in
the management of numerous institutions (e.g. the public employment service, social insurance
carriers, vocational training, universities etc.). 
The national trade union confederation, the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund)
comprises ca. 11 million members in public and private sectors in its affiliated sectoral unions.
It has only indirect influence on collective bargaining at sectoral and regional levels but is the
principal representative of the German trade union movement at the national level and in
consultative bodies. Unlike its counterparts in France and the Netherlands the German union
movement is not fragmented along ideological and confessional lines in rival confederations.
The largest member unions, e.g. Metal Workers (IGMetall) and the union of public employees
(ÖTV), frequently play an independent political role. 
The BDA national organization of German employers' associations (Bundesvereinigung
der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) represents employers with about 80 per cent of private
sector employment and 80 per cent to 90 per cent of employers are affiliated. It plays a leading
role in consultations between employers and the state and is presented in all important
consultative bodies. In contrast to the trade unions, employers' interest outside industrial
relations are represented by multiple organizations, of which the Industry Associations and
Chambers of Commerce are the most important. 
2.2 Tripartism in the public employment service
The German Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; BA) is a self-governing body
incorporated under public law. It is responsible for both active policies (placement, vocational
counseling, labour market training and other active programmes ) as well as for the
administration of unemployment benefits. Its self-governing organs have a tripartite structure
with equal representation of employees, employers and public bodies (Federal and Land
Governments, and local governments). This principle is applied both at the national level of
its Governing Council (Verwaltungsrat) and Executive Board (Vorstand) as well as at the level
37
52The Executive board is composed of 3 representatives of the social partners as well as three public
representatives (1 from the federal government, 1 from the Bundesrat, the Federal Council of the Länder, and 1 from the
Deutscher Städtetag, the national organization of the German municipalities. The Council is composed of 17 representatives
from each group. The administrative committees at the regional and local levels consist of from 15 to 27 members (the exact
number is set by the Council). The administrative committees of the local PES offices consist of from 9 to 21 members --
the exact number is fixed by the administrative committees of the regional PES offices.
53 Resources in the form of unemployment insurance contributions and any accumulated reserves .
of the regional and the local employment offices with their tripartite administrative committees
(Verwaltungsausschüsse). Representatives of the social partners are appointed on the basis of
nominations from employers' and trade union organizations at the respective levels (§195
AFG). 52
The BA's tripartite Council and Executive Board play an important role in the selection
of principal BA officers. The presidents and vice-presidents of the BA and of the Land regional
labour offices are nominated by the Federal government and appointed by the Federal
President. However, the Federal government is required to consult with the BA's tripartite
governing Council before making nominations and may deviate from its advice only for
"serious reasons." Other high officials of the BA are nominated by the BA's executive board.
(§211 AG).
The Council enacts the statutes of the BA and issues decrees and regulations within the
scope of its autonomy. It must ratify the budget proposed by the Executive Board, which must
subsequently be approved by the Federal Government. The BA is financed through
unemployment insurance contributions by employers and employees, the contribution rate is,
however, determined by statute and not by the BA itself. 
The tripartite administrative committees of the Regional and Local Employment Offices
assume the tasks of self-government for their respective districts, including submission of
proposals for the central budget and consultation by the nomination of the President and Vice-
President of the regional PES offices or the director of the local PES. The administrative
committees oversee PES operations principally through specialized committees, e.g. the Job
Creation Programme  Committee. Members of the administrative committees are recruited
from the regional offices of the trade unions or employers' association and from Land level of
public authorities. In the case of the local PES committees, recruitment is from local union and
employers' association officials and from the municipalities and their associations (Linke 1994).
National level
Despite its status as a self-governing institution, the BA's independence is in practice
limited. Both administrative regulations (Anordnungen) and the budget approved by its Council
require the approval of the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs (and in some cases
the Minister of Finance). Moreover, regulations and, if the BA's budget is in deficit, budgetary
stipulations can be directly imposed by the Minister if the BA's own administration fails to
comply with his instructions (§191, §216 AFG). 
The limited autonomy of the BA vis-à-vis the government is best illustrated by the budget
process since the fact that the BA has its own budget and funding through contributions is its
greatest mark of independence in comparison with other tripartite labour administrations (Linke
1994; Bruche and Reissert 1984). 53 Although the BA formulates its own budget, it has no
control over the contribution rate on the revenue side nor, for example, over benefit levels or
training stipends, which are fixed by statute. Moreover, its budget it has to be approved by the
Federal Government (the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs). Since 1993 the Minister can
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54By statute the Federal government must finance any deficit that the BA is unable to finance from contributions
or its (non-existent) reserves. 
implement the budget on his own authority if the Council does not accept the budgetary
stipulations imposed by the Minister. This situation can arise, only if the BA's budget is in
deficit (§216 AFG), i.e. it is unable to finance proposed expenditures through its own resources
(unemployment benefit contributions and any reserves it may have accumulated). However, the
current high levels of structural unemployment and the high costs of transfers to East Germany
mean that there is a chronic budget deficit and that, consequently, the BA has experienced a
significant loss of independence (Linke 1994). 
Budget issues, in particular about the level of ALMP expenditure, have in fact been a
principal source of conflict between the BA's self-governing organs and the government in
recent years. There have been such controversies already in the past (Haushaltsstrukturgesetz
of 1976; Arbeitsföderungskonsolidierungsgesetz of 1982; Haushaltsbegleitgesetz of 1984) in
which cases the government imposed its will through statutory changes. More recently
(December 1992) the BA's Council refused for the first time to implement a budget with cuts
imposed by the government (the 1993 budget). This conflict was repeated the following year
as the Council refused to implement the 1994 budget because of its opposition to massive cuts
in training programmes  due to take effect in that year. Nevertheless, due to the legislative
changes noted above (10th Amendment to the Labour Promotion Act, §216 Para.3), the
Minister was empowered as of January 1 1993 to impose the stipulated budgetary changes even
without the consent of the Council. Because almost all decisions of the self-governing bodies
of the BA have financial consequences, the Minister is now in a much stronger position to
impose his views regarding active measures than was the case in the past (see Linke 1994: 18-
19). 
A similar conflict occurred over the 1997 budget. The Federal government approved the
BA's budget only with amendments regarding the level of the proposed deficit (reduction from
9.4 to 4.1 billion DM) and itemized instructions as to how this was to be implemented. In this
case a majority consisting of representatives of trade unions and of the Länder and
municipalities voted not to implement the budget, objecting to the cuts in active measures and
to the Government's efforts to shift the risk of an increase in the deficit due to deteriorating
labour market conditions onto the BA. 54 In this case employer representatives supported the
position of the Federal government. Employers argued that the effectiveness of active measures
was declining and that it was important to reduce the Federal budget deficit and unemployment
insurance contributions of enterprises in order to improve the environment for economic growth
and the expansion of employment (BA Geschäftsbericht 1996).  In recent years the social
partners also disagreed over the legalization of private employment agencies, which was
opposed by the DGB but advocated by the BDA employers' association. 
In other situations the social partners also exhibit shared interests regarding labour market
policies and the BA as a tripartite institution. For example, the social partners have recently
criticized the extent to which costs related to German unification (transfers for unemployment
benefits and active measures in East Germany) have been financed from unemployment
insurance contributions (the BA's revenue base), resulting in a chronic deficit, and called for
a shift in financing toward reliance on general revenues in the financing of non-insurance
related tasks of the BA. Both also rejected proposals to include representatives of other societal
groups besides trade union and employers' organizations associations in the BA's
administration. They criticized, furthermore, a proposed increase in power of the Minister for
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Labour and Social Affairs to intervene in the internal affairs of the BA. The social partners
were also in agreement in criticizing the government's plans to take severance payments into
consideration in the future in calculating entitlement to unemployment benefit, which increases
the costs of redundancies to both employers and employees (BA Geschäftsbericht 1996).
In summary, the independence of the BA is quite limited: Not only is it financially
dependent on the Federal government, especially in periods of deficit financing, but even its
regulations (Anordnungen) require not only the approval of the BA's Council but also the
approval of the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs. There is thus not only a general legal
supervision of its activities by the Minister BMAS but also a detailed oversight and potentially
control of its activities. 
Tripartism at local level 
There has been no systematic study in Germany of the operation of the functioning of the
tripartite administrative committees at the employment service district level and their impact
on active measures. Nevertheless, the finding of numerous local implementation case studies
suggest that the tripartite bodies have little importance in policy-making at the local level, even
in comparison with their limited influence at the national level (Maier 1988; Hübner et al.
1991). Thus Maier (1988) reports that while there is considerable variation in local style, the
norm is routine committee work with 4 to 6 meetings per year. The actors involved perceive
little possibility for influencing policy and their principal function appears to be to serve as a
channel of communication about local PES activities to local actors. If the tripartite
administrative committees actually attempt to become involved in policy-making, the local PES
office regards this as interference in their work and reacts warily (FM 160-164, 181-188). The
involvement of the social partners at the local PES level varies somewhat depending on the
policy area. Whereas in case of direct job creation measures (ABM), a policy area of great
interest to the social partners and the municipalities, every proposal is examined at least pro-
forma (ABM-committee), training policies are usually not even discussed in the self-.governing
bodies (Maier 1988: 229; Hübner et al. 1991).
Our own interviews confirmed the findings of the existing case study literature: The local
administrative committee meets typically only 4 time per year. Its activities are largely formal
with little real impact on policies. The local PES office regards it as just another "transmission
belt" for information to local actors but not even as an especially important one. Most active
is the local ABM (job creation project) - committee, which meets typically once per month.
Even in this case, however, approval of projects is routine. As a rule a long-list of projects is
read out and approved without discussion. If there is any conflict, it is typically about the
geographic distribution of projects rather than, for example, between the social partners.
Industry groups (e.g. landscaping firms) sometimes express concern about unfair competition
from projects; unions sometimes criticize subsidies going to industry through training and
retraining measures (F&U), for example, in connection with training offered as part of
packages to attract new regional investments, but there is no real opposition. Local PES
officials report that they do take comments of employer, employee and public representatives
into consideration in formulating policies but that this is not a major influence. 
A principal explanation for the passivity of the local tripartite committees appears to be
the generally low level of policy autonomy enjoyed by local German PES offices in the highly
centralized German delivery system for labour market policy. Whereas at the national level
(Council) the interests of the social partners do have some impact - within the restrictive
framework set by the BMA -- the density of national regulation of labour market policy so
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55 The Labour Promotion Act (AFG) merely provides a legal framework but leaves many details open; this
dimension of local variation in programme  implementation is not discussed here. 
reduces policy autonomy at the local level there is little motivation to participate. Moreover,
there appears to be a structural dissonance between the Employment Service Office's status as
the local affiliate of a national and politically neutral Federal agency and involvement in and
commitment to local political constellations and policy initiatives (Maier 1988).
The representatives of the social partners are not inactive on labour market issues in the
local policy arena, but they direct their activities and exercise influence largely through many
other informal and formal channels (e.g. local employment and training initiatives, regional
planning commissions) rather than through the local tripartite administrative committees of the
public employment service.
 
Scope and limits of local PES autonomy
 The scope and limits of local PES office autonomy in policy making can be illustrated
with reference to the budgeting process. From the point of view of decentral autonomy there
are two principal questions: 1)To what extent can the local PES office influence the structure
(i.e. policy mix) and level of its annual budget allocation?" 2) To what extent can budgeted
expenditures be reallocated during the course of the year between budget items in response to
changes in the labour market situation or to better reflect local priorities? 55 
In principle the annual BA budget process takes place in the form of a "bottom up"
notification of funding requirements for the next fiscal year and a "top down" allocation of
resources in the form of line item budgets. Each year beginning in February the local PES
offices and their governing boards determine their budget requirements for administration and
programmes , which are submitted to the regional Land level (LAA). After discussion in the
Land administrative boards, the Land budget proposals are submitted to the central BA office
in Nürnberg. The administrative board of the BA decides on the allocation of funds to the Land
on the basis of the budget requests of the PES offices and in light of the national BA budget
framework agreed with the Federal government. In recent years this process has become
shorter and increasingly centralized as the BA itself has lost considerable budgetary autonomy
vis-à-vis the Federal government due to its chronic budget deficits. There is general agreement
that this formal picture of the budget process from bottom up and then top down corresponds
little to reality, that the budgeting process in reality has become quite centralized, and that the
local PES offices have little influence over their budget allocations (Linke 1994; Maier 1988,
Bruche and Reissert 1985.)
Important for the degree of fiscal autonomy of the local PES offices is the distinction
between entitlements (Pflichtleistungen), i.e. unemployment benefit, short-time benefit, and
discretionary measures (Kannleistungen). In the case of discretionary measures, which includes
all active programmes  such as training and subsidized employment, the Land and local PES
offices may request levels of funding that reflect their own policy preferences. There is by
contrast in principle little or no local PES discretion in administering entitlements because they
are based on legal claims. For these items the allocation to local PES offices is based solely on
the projected uptake, which is largely a result of labour market conditions. 
In the case of discretionary measures (Kannleistungen) the regional labour offices are
allocated budget ceilings by BA, in part negotiated and in part just communicated by the BA
(an intervention reserve is withheld by the BA). The BA can reallocate funding in case there
is an indication that available funds will not be exhausted by individual LAAs. Special
41
56According to Bruche and Reissert (1985) there is little regional rivalry over the distribution of the expenditure
for discretionary programmes  because of: 1) the passive behavior of the local PES offices (Normervollzug); 2) limited
capacity to implement (additional) programmes  due to chronic personnel shortages; 3) the split in formulation of local
labour market policies between the PES offices on the one hand and regional (Land) and local authorities on the other
(Bruche and Reissert 1985: 80).
57This sometimes even takes the form of informal ` loans` from one PES office to another experiencing a financial
bottleneck.
58For example, by greater reliance on "freie Maßnahmen instead of (more expensive) "Auftragsmaßnahmen,"
procedures are followed for the allocation of funds for job creation programmes , which is
determined by the ABM-Ausschuß of the BA's Council. Each year a formula for allocation of
available funds is decided based on funding for ABM requested by LAAs, their unemployment
rate and share of problem groups among the unemployed. The Land PES offices steer local
PES office expenditure through ceilings or through continuous control of expenditure with the
possibility of budget caps if expenditure threatens to exceed available funding Since 1983 the
extent to which the Länder use their own resources to support ABM play a role. (Bruche and
Reissert 1985). 56 
Once annual budgets have been fixed, flexibility depends largely on the extent to which
individual budget items have been declared to be fungible (gegenseitig deckungsfähig), which
is historically rather limited in the German tradition of line item budgets. Moreover, this
limited room for reallocation of resources can only be exercised by the BA itself but not by the
Land or local PES offices (Bruche and Reissert 1985: 73ff). 
In recent years greater budget flexibility has been introduced at the local level. Local PES
offices may now at their own discretion shift up to 20 per cent of their funds from job creation
to training measures and vice versa (OECD 1996:29). Moreover, a new programme  (§249h)
permits unemployment benefit entitlements to be redirected to wage subsidies for the long-term
unemployed in certain types of social and environmental projects. Originally introduced in the
East, this programme  has now been extended to West Germany (§242s).
Evidence from interviews suggests that local PES officials regard the budget allocation
process for active measures as being based on a complicated national formula that is essentially
outside of their own control. They regard the above mentioned 20 per cent fungibility of funds
between the job creation and training items in their budgets as their primary budgetary room
for maneuver in setting local policy priorities. Another source of flexibility within a PES region
is through the reallocation of budgeted funds from one PES office where allocated funds are
being underutilized to another PES office where the funds can be obligated. 57 
It should be noted parenthetically that actual local PES outputs may differ in important
respects even apart from differences in the level and composition of expenditure for active
measures since PES offices are allocated a fixed sum for each type of measure independent of
the actual number of participants. Thus the measures implemented by a local PES office may,
for example, give more emphasis to shorter training measures for a larger number of
participants or to measures with lower costs per place. 58 Moreover, by combining BA resources
with other locally and regionally generated resources (i.e. from municipalities, Länder, the
EU), for example, in job creating measures, PES offices may increase the number of
programme  participants at a given level of BA funding. 
The recent reform of the German Employment Service, which will not come into effect
until January 1998, appears to entail a dramatic increase in decentralization in the BA to the
advantage of the local PES offices. Ten percent of funds for discretionary measures (i.e. active
programmes ) are to be allocated in the form of an "innovation fund" over which the local PES
can freely dispose for innovative local measures (§9 AFRG). Moreover, the new ARFG
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apparently introduces global budget allocations with great freedom to shift funds and set local
priorities (§371 AFRG), although the full extent of local PES autonomy will not be clear until
the relevant regulations have been issued. At the same time yet-to-be-specified performance
indicators for the local PES' "integration budget" are to be introduced. It remains to be seen
whether this new decision-making autonomy at the local level will lead to a revitalization of
the previously dormant role of the local tripartite committees in PES governance.
2.3 Collective agreements and active policies
Collective agreements are an important arena of labour market policy for the social
partners in Germany. Their greatest impact has been undoubtedly their contribution to
employment policy through reductions in working time. Since the mid-1980s the principal
impetus for work sharing in the form of reduced weekly working time has come from trade
unions, especially IG Metall, the largest German union representing employees in metal
working and electronics industries. After a major strike in 1984, a series of agreements for
reductions in weekly working time were concluded, culminating in the 1990 agreement to
reduce weekly working time in stages to 35 hours per week by 1995. 
These agreements have influenced trends in other sectors, although there is considerable
variation by sector in the emphasis given to reduced weekly working time (Seifert 1991, Bosch
1994). The average weekly working time in collective agreements at the end of 1994 was 37.75
hours in West Germany; the corresponding figures for East Germany in 1993 were 39.97).
This trend will continue as existing collective agreements provide for further cuts in future
years, most importantly for ca. 4.8 million employees covered by agreements on the
introduction of the 35 hour week (Classen 1994). This goal was first reached in the metal
working and electronics industry in 1995.
In contrast to the state support for reductions in working time in France since the 1980s,
and public support for similar trade union initiatives in the 1980s in the Netherlands,
government policy in Germany was critical of the trade union campaign (as were employers).
The Kohl government introduced an early retirement programme  as an alternative to cuts in
weekly hours, and, more recently, government policy has endorsed promotion of part-time
work. The principal contribution of public policy to these favorable trends in reductions in
standard working time has been to provide a regulatory framework for working time that
permits the social partners to regulate, within broad limits, daily and weekly working time,
overtime, night and weekend work. 
Innovative work sharing
 The introduction of a 32-hour work week by collective agreement at Volkswagen has
proved to be the forerunner of a new style of reductions in working time in crisis situations in
Germany. Since April 1 1994 collective agreements in the German metal working and electrical
equipment industries contain a provision that allows for voluntary plant-level agreements to
preserve employment (”Tarifverträge zur Beschäftigungssicherung”). There are two basic
variants to these agreements on temporary reductions in working time to preserve employment
as stipulated in the relevant area collective agreements by which working time can be reduced
to as low as 30 hours per week: 1) reduction in working time for all employees with an
employment guarantee for the life of the agreement; 2) reduction in working time affecting
only part of the workforce in which there is a partial compensation of wage losses (1 per cent
to 7 per cent depending on reduction in hours) but no employment guarantee. The first option
is intended in particular for firms who have exhausted their contingent of regular short-time
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59 The authors are grateful to Dick Moraal and Els Sol for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the
Dutch case study. 
work and the second is a possible alternative to the short-time work programme .
According to a survey conducted in July of 1994, uptake of this new form of worksharing
has been strong with 110 enterprises accounting for 16 per cent of all employees having
concluded such agreements. On the assumption of an average reduction in working time of 10
per cent for the 500,000 employees affected by such agreements, the study implies a maximum
potential impact of up to 50,000 dismissals avoided (IFO 1994). Similar provisions were
subsequently introduced in collective agreements in other sectors (Rosdücher and Seifert 1994).
The VW agreement itself entails a 20 per cent cut in working time for ca. 100,000 German
employees or 20,000 redundancies avoided. Although no reliable data is available, it appears
reasonable to assume that this innovative form of work sharing accounted for 50 - 100,000
redundancies (full-time equivalents) avoided in German industry at is peak in 1994 (Seifert
1995).
3. The Netherlands 59
3.1 Introduction 
Until the mid-1960s the Netherlands represented a classical case of neo-corporatism in
which national representative of the social partners played a direct and established role in social
and economic policy-making, institutionalized in national tripartite institutions (Foundation of
Labour, Socio-Economic Council). Since the 1970s, however, collective bargaining takes place
at the sectoral level and the role of the national organizations of the social partners is largely
confined to making recommendations to their members and participation in consultative
institutions at the national level.
Historically, a special characteristic of Dutch industrial relations organization and of
Dutch corporatism has been fragmentation along ideological and confessional lines. Trade
unions, employers' organizations, and political parties were organized separately in relatively
self-contained Catholic, Protestant, and socialist "pillars." These pillars constituted traditionally
"an integrated network of organizations and institutions on an ideological basis, i.e. socialist
and confessional" (Struyk 1956). Lijphart (1968) coined the term "consociational democracy"
for the Dutch pattern of societal divisions along not only socio-economic but also religious
lines.
The Social and Economic Council (SER) founded in 1950 is the most important
consultative organ for socio-economic questions. Employers' associations and trade unions each
nominate one third of its 33 members; the remaining third are public members nominated by
the government. Until the end of 1994 the government was obligated by law to seek the advice
of the employers and trade unions in economic and social policy. 
The other central discussion forum of the social partners is the Stichting van de Arbeid
(STAR; Labour Foundation; 1945). The same employers' associations and trade unions are also
represented in the Labour Foundation, but it is a bipartite body without public representatives.
These two key organizations in the Dutch system of co-ordinated policy making work closely
together - they are even located in the same building in den Haag and share some facilities.
Whereas the SER has a broader mandate for socio-economic questions, the focus of
deliberations in the STAR is industrial relations: wages, working conditions, vocational
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training, and working time issues. 
The most important Dutch employers' associations have been the the VNO Federation
of Dutch Industry and the NCW Dutch Association of Christian Employers, which together
represent about 90 per cent of larger employers. In 1995 they merged into one national
association named 'VNO-NCW'. The KNOV Royal Dutch Federation of Industry and the
confessional NCOV Christian Entrepreneurs' Association of the Netherlands, the two largest
employers' associations of small and medium-sized enterprises, also recently merged to form
the 'MKB-Nederland' (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Netherlands), with which
approximately 35-40 per cent of such enterprises are affiliated. The neutral KNLC, Catholic
KNBTB, and Protestant NCBTB represent employers in the agricultural sector; in 1995 they
merged to form 'LTO' (Agricultural enterprises). 
Employers' associations
C VNO/NCW makes recommendations but plays no direct role in collective bargaining.
It is represented in all important national consultative bodies and has 7 of the 11 seats
allocated to employers in the SER. It was formed by the 1995 merger of the VNO and
NCW. The VNO Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (Netherlands Employers'
Association) includes over 100 industry and specialized associations and ca. 200 direct
members representing approximately 30,000 enterprises with 10 or more employees.
The NCW Netherlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (Netherlands Association of
Christian Employers) has 95 industry and specialized associations, 300 direct members
and 5 regional associations represent approximately 30,000 enterprises with 10 or more
employees. 
C The MKB-Nederland (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Netherlands) includes the
previous KNOV Koninklijk Nederlands Ondernemersverbond (Royal Dutch Federation
of Industry), which comprised 100,000 smaller and middle-sized enterprises with ca
660,000 employees, and the NCOV Netherlands Christelijk Ondernemers Verbond
(Christian Entrepreneurs' Association of the Netherlands) with 40 sectoral and industry
associations representing more than 4000 enterprises with 25 employees or less (ca.
200,000 employees). The national organization is represented in all larger national
consultative bodies but has no direct role in collective bargaining. The MKB-Nederland
has 3 seats in the Social and Economic Council. The three agriculural associations that
merged to form the LTO are represented with 1 seat in the Social and Economic Council.
There are four principal Dutch national union federations to which trade unions in all
sectors of the economy, industry and services, public and private sectors belong (Van Dijk,
Akkermans, Hövels 1988; MISEP 1996). The FNV, which emerged from the union of the
social-democratic NVV and the Catholic NKV in 1981, is the largest trade union confederation
with over one million members and accounting for about 60 per cent of all organized workers.
The confessional CNV National Association of Christian Trade Unions includes about 20 per
cent of all union members. Originally it organized Protestant workers, but in recent years the
share of Catholics among its members has increased. In 1975 trade unions for senior and
medium-ranking managers and staff founded a national federation of their own, the Vereniging
voor Hoger en Middelbaar Personeel (MHP). Its circa 140,000 members acount for
approximately 8 per cent of all organized workers. Approximately 15 per cent of unions are
not affiliated with any of these national organizations. 
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In 1990 the Algemene Vakcentrale (AVC) was established as a fourth national
federation. It is composed of three sectors: a federation of organizations of employees in the
public sector (the Amtenaren Centrale - AC), a federation of employee organizations in the
semi-public sector (predominantly health and welfare), and a federation of employee
organizations in the private sector. Approximately 6 per cent of all unionized workers are
affiliated with this organization. In addition to these four national federations there are a
number of non-federated unions, who organise about 8 per cent of the unionized workers. 
Trade Union Confederations
C FNV Federatie van Nederlandse Vakverenigingen (Federation of Dutch Trade Unions).
A secular organization that emerged from the union of the social-democratic NVV and
the Catholic NKV in 1981. The FNV is represented in national consultative bodies and
has 7 of the 11 union seats in the Social and Economic Council.
C CNV Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (National Association of Christian Trade Unions)
Predominantly Protestant. The CNV is represented in national consultative bodies and
has 2 of the 11 union seats in the Social and Economic Council.
C MHP Vakcentrale voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (Union of Middle and Higher
Management Personnel). With a membership of ca. 140,000 managers the third largest
national union organization above the sectoral level. Most members are in private sector.
It has 1 representative in the Social and Economic Council and is represented in all major
national consultative bodies. 
C AVC Algemene Vakcentrale (General Union Federation). 100,000 members largely in
public sector. No direct role in collective bargaining. Frequently represented in national
consultative bodies, since 1994 one seat in Social and Economic Council.
3.2 Tripartism in the public employment service
 The Dutch public employment service was established with the Labour Exchange Act of
1930, which also provided the legal basis for a PES monopoly by banning employment
agencies from operating without a government license. Only after 1945 was a formal advisory
role institutionalized for the social partners ("Central Committee for Assistance and
Counseling"). In conjunction with the introduction of active labour market policy after 1969,
the role of the social partners was further strengthened by the establishment of the Labour
Market Council within the Socio-Economic Council, the high level tripartite advisory council.
In 1971 Regional Labour Market Councils were established in every province. 
Although the Netherlands has a long tradition of corporatist policy making, PES
tripartism in the sense of formal participation of the social partners in the administration of
active policies was first introduced in 1991. Previously only unemployment benefits had been
funded and administered by bipartite sectoral level funds under the direction of the social
partners. 
The 1991 changes in the Dutch employment service toward a tripartite and decentralized
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structure were circa 10 years in the making. In 1984/1985 the SER's Labour Market Council
issued a report, after four years of deliberations, endorsing reform of the public employment
service, including a strong recommendation for tripartite structures at both the central and local
levels. According to participants and observers, the primary impetus for the reforms was the
poor performance of the existing PES and criticism of it, especially by employers. 
The tripartite form emerged only slowly in the reform discussions. Christian union and
employers' organizations were early proponents, and this approach was ultimately accepted by
all major actors. The unions saw their involvement in the new organization as an expression
of their commitment to full employment and to equitable distribution of employment.
Employers were motivated by their negative experience with the PES organization in the past
and by their experience with collectively negotiated agreements on active policies, which had
suffered from a lack of institutional support. Employers' representatives hoped to improve the
linkages between sectoral policies and the PES (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 168ff). The
willingness of the national organizations of the social partners to participate in a tripartite
labour administration is also related to their search for a new role after the decentralization of
Dutch collective bargaining to the sectoral level. 
The Dutch reforms of the public employment service reflected a new model of policy
implementation. The previous implementation structure had been a traditional centralized
administrative structure in which the social partners had only an advisory role at the national
and regional levels. The new policy model was based on the premise that this form of
hierarchical intervention was anachronistic and that a more decentralized and locally oriented
delivery system was required, in which the role of the PES was less the administration of
national programmes  as active networking of public and private actors at the regional level.
It was argued that the PES itself could only have a partial impact and improving labour market
performance was only possible if the PES played a role in co-ordinating the activities of all the
actors concerned (Moraal 1994: 4). 
An important background for the 1990 reforms was the de facto increasing diversification
of the delivery of active measures. In addition to the classical active programmes  of the
employment service, the social partners acting on the basis of collective agreements and the
municipalities have become increasingly important actors. Dutch municipalities, who play an
increasingly important role in Dutch labour market policy because of their responsibility for
social assistance and labour market programmes  for this clientele, strongly favored a far-
reaching decentralization of the PES but initially opposed tripartism (Visser and Hemerijck
1997: 166ff, Moraal 1994).
The 1991 reform and tripartism
After the 1991 reorganization of the PES both the central and the regional boards of the
new labour market authority, which is formally independent of the labour ministry, are
tripartite bodies. The central board (CBA) consisted of three representatives of the national
organizations of the employers and trade union and three state representatives (Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, Economics Ministry, Education Ministry), whereas the regional
(RBA) offices included representatives of employers, trade unions, and the municipalities. At
both the national and regional levels a qualified majority of 2 representatives of each group in
the tripartite board was required for substantive decisions, i.e. any group could veto a decision.
The fact that the government had only three seats on the central PES board and the need for
a qualified majority means too that policy could not be dictated by the labour ministry. 
The new labour market authority was intended to be completely independent from the
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. This was reinforced inter alia by giving the new
organization its own statutory budget, which was supposed to provide stable financing for a
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multi-year period. The autonomy of the regional offices was reinforced by placing them under
the direct control of the tripartite regional employment boards without any hierarchical
subordination to the national employment office. The central board and office merely formulate
overall guidelines for labour market policy. The central board was authorized to issue a
directive to the regional boards only if 6 of the 9 voting members approved such a measure and
this extraordinary majority had to include at least two voting members from each group on the
central board. 
Goals of tripartism in the public employment service
There were a number of clear expectations associated with the introduction of tripartism
in an autonomous labour administration (Arbeidsvoorziening 1990, Moraal 1994). As noted
above, a basic premise of the reforms was that the goals of labour market policy cannot be
achieved by the PES alone but only in co-operation with other relevant actors, especially the
social partners and the municipalities. The reforms were based on the assumption that co-
ordination in active policies could be best achieved by includng the relevant actors in tripartite
PES governing bodies. It was assumed that giving the social partners full responsibility would
increase their commitment toward active policies and that co-operation in the labour market
authority would lead other actors to adapt their policies to those of the ministry:
1. It was expected that the participation of the social partners in the national PES governing
body CBA would improve the linkages between the PES, which is organized along
regional geographic lines, and the sectoral organization of the social partners and
collective bargaining because many active programmes  have a strong sectoral
orientation, e.g. initial and further training. Moreover, active measures in the
Netherlands are frequently implemented by the social partners at the sectoral level in
collective agreements. 
2. The tripartite structures at the national level were also designed to improve co-ordination
within the state sector among the three ministries represented in the national labour
market board (Economics, Education, Labour and Social Affairs).
3. Participation of the social partners in PES governance was also expected to improve the
PES's image, especially among employers, and to increase their willingness to use its
services, e.g. notification of vacancies and hiring through the PES.
4. Representation of municipalities on PES regional boards was expected to improve the co-
ordination of PES activities with those of the municipalities, which play an increasingly
important role in labour market policy because of their responsibility for social assistance
recipients. 
5. From the government's point of view tripartism meant devolution of responsibility for
unemployment to the social partners, depoliticizing what may well be an intractable
problem.
 
The official evaluation of tripartism in the Netherlands
An official evaluation of the impact of the 1991 reforms examined inter alia the impact
of tripartism. Its finding can be summarized as follows (Dercksen and de Koning 1996: 23-30;
Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 170-72):
1. The evaluation results on the efficiency of tripartite management of the PES were
negative: The evaluation stated that the central board had failed in its management
responsibilities, letting decentralization go too far, managing finances poorly, and being
slow and indecisive in making decisions. Although intended to promote policies based
on unanimity, the representation of interests in the CBA came to the forefront: "This
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60 One such conflict was over a ruling by the Chamber of Auditors that the Minister had not only to supervise the
lawfulness of expenditures but also their efficient use. The social partners protested this ruling as incompatible with the
tripartite administrative structure (OECD 1996).
created differences of opinions which could not be solved within the management
structure, and this again led to indecisiveness and postponement of decision-making"
(Dercksen and de Koning 1996: 24). 
2. A special structural problem was seen in the ostensibly equal status of the social partners
and government in the CBA national governing board and the fact that the government
side provided all funding and was given supervisory powers over the PES. It should be
noted that, ironically, the principal cleavage in the national board was not between the
social partners but between them and the government: In contravention of the original
stipulation that the PES's independence be reinforced by granting it a budget fixed by
statute for four years, the government's subsidy to the organization was in fact reduced
four times. In 1994 the anger of the social partners about budget cuts and interventions
by the ministry even led them to threaten to withdraw from the national board.  60 
3. The evaluation report criticized the "slip stream" theory adopted by the PES and strongly
advocated by the social partners. According to the "slip stream" strategy, the PES can
best assist problem groups to find regular employment if the PES has a good reputation
with employers and a high market share in placements. The evaluation commission
criticized this approach as being ineffective, and the representatives of employers and
trade unions were accused of acting "in the interest of their own members" rather than
for the "common good." 
4. Contrary to the expectations of the reform, no links were established to sectoral collective
bargaining. Moreover, co-operation between the PES and the sectoral social security
institutions of the social partners was found to be rare. Although there had been an
increase in the number of training and placement agreements between the PES and
various branches of industry, the evaluation was of the opinion that these agreements
could have been accomplished even without tripartite structures based on the interests of
the parties concerned. 
5. The PES was found to have an ambivalent attitude toward temporary work agencies.
While the managerial level was inclined to see their usefulness, the operational level in
PES offices regarded them as rivals. Moreover, the evaluation found a certain distortion
of competition in the fact that the PES co-operated intensively with the non-profit (and
tripartite) START temporary work agencies for problem groups (granting them for
example direct access to their data base) but not with other commercial agencies.
6. Co-operation with municipal social services improved but this aspect of the reform was
not entirely successful. The evaluation found a somewhat confusing variety of forms
which "reduce rather than improve the transparency of placement services". The limited
success in achieving greater co-operation with municipal labour market intermediaries
was also due to differences in approach to placement: Whereas the PES usually had a
vacancy-oriented approach, the municipal placement services had a client-centered
approach focusing on the needs of their own target group, recipients of social assistance
(Dercksen and de Koning 1996:30).
The evaluation commission as well as the Dutch cabinet conclude that the government
and not the social partners had to take the lead for active labour market policy. Critics suggest
that the evaluation commission took a too centralist, top-down view in evaluating the role of
the social partners, neglecting alternative solutions. It focused on problems in the operation of
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61 In contrast to its principal conclusions, the Commission itself acknowledged the good regional results when
communicating to the press: "....most of the Regional Boards developed a pragmatic and effective policy style. While
decentralization resulted in better targeting of labour market policies to regional situations, it has, however, made it more
difficult to implement a national policy in all regions" (Persbericht van de Evaluaautiecommissie-van Dijk 9 maart 1995).
the central board and paid little attention to the favorable results at the regional level. 61
Reform of the reform
In the aftermath of the 1994 evaluation, the Dutch cabinet endorsed a number of changes
in the PES. In addition to a greater concentration of PES services on the hard-to-place
unemployed, a number of organizational changes were also approved, which came into effect
in January 1997. Despite the evaluation report's criticism of the functioning of tripartism in the
PES, it was retained as a basic principle of PES governance. There are, however, a number
of changes in the way tripartism is implemented. Most importantly decisions in the future will
not be based on qualified majority voting but a simple majority will suffice, i.e. the group veto
was eliminated. Moreover, the board members will in the future be expected to hold office in
the public interest and not as interest group representatives; an even stronger proposal in the
evaluation report to limit social partners' right of nomination to persons not on the payroll of
these organizations was not implemented. The government itself will no longer be directly
represented in the central labour market board (CBA) but will nominate independent
representatives of the public interest. 
There are, moreover, a number of changes that apparently greatly reduce the
independence of the PES and its regional offices in contrast to the previous structure: The
supervisory role of the Ministry of Social Affairs regarding policies and financing was
strengthened including increased oversight over the efficiency of PES operations by the
responsible minister, who may now issue directives to the PES. Furthermore the PES central
broad is now required to confer on policies twice each year with the minister of social affairs.
Finally, the PES's budget is subject to the annual appropriations process. 
A principal issue during the adoption of the new employment service law was the target
group orientation of the PES. Whereas the government (Ministry of Social Affairs) wanted it
to focus on the hard-to-place, the social partners rejected this proposal. They feared that that
PES offices would become a dumping ground for social problem groups and even threatened
to withdraw from the tripartite institutions if such a policy were adopted. The social partners,
like the PES itself, generally endorsed the slip stream theory, according to which the PES can
only assist problem groups to find regular employment if they have a good reputation with
employers and a strong position in the labour market. The final compromise categorizes the
unemployed according to the amount of training and work experience needed to place them,
ranging from category one workers, who should be able to find a job on their own, to category
four workers who have no chance of finding employment. The PES is to target its own
resources on intermediate groups, i.e. neither the easy to place nor those who cannot be
realistically placed but on those among the long-term unemployed, women, foreigners, and the
partially disabled for whom placement is possible in combination with active measures. 
 The recommendation of the Dutch evaluation commission meant a return to a more
centralized implementation structure in which government plays the dominant role. The
networks of the social partners, which played a vital role during the reform period, have now
greatly reduced their activity at the local level. As an alternative, Sol and Glebbeek propose,
for example, a ` bottom-up` approach, incorporating government, the social partners, and their
networks in horizontal cooperation at the local level ('onderhandelend bestuur'; negotiated
policy); this approach would strengthen the regional policy level, leaving the central level with
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62 E. Sol en A. Glebbeek e.a., Arbeidsvoorziening en Onderhandelend bestuur. De positie van derden-be-
langhebbenden in een tripartite structuur. Amsterdam: AUP, 1998 (forthcoming).
a supportive function. 62 
In other organizational changes, PES job center's, industrial insurance boards, and
municipal social services are to be required to integrate their services to the unemployed youth
and the long-term unemployed, although an institutional merger of these separate organizations
is not planned, the number of employment service regions is to be reduced, more transparent
budgeting and more market orientation in the provision of labour market services.
3.3 Collective agreements and active policies
The Dutch social partners have played an active role in labour market policy though
national framework agreements between the national organizations of the social partners and
the government, which constitutes a recommendation to the social partners at the sectoral and
enterprise levels. For example, the landmark 1986 framework agreement provides for wage
subsidies for the long-term unemployed, the concentration of youth job creation programmes
on those with low skill and other labour market handicaps, and for the establishment of sectoral
and enterprise level training funds based on collective agreement (Chronik 25, July 1986).
Prior to this time the focus of collectively bargained labour market policies had been on
working time reductions since a similar agreement in 1983, which also included provisions for
the reintegration of labour market problem groups.
As a result of such agreements non-governmental actors play an important role in labour
market policy. It has been estimated, for example, that collectively agreed special funds for
education and training (O&O funds) have expenditures of around 300 million Dutch Guilders,
usually financed by a levy on employers' gross wage bill. The largest of these funds is found
in the metal and electronics industry in which the levy is set at .55 per cent of the annual wage
bill; of this amount 0.25 per cent is earmarked for the apprenticeship system, 0.2 per cent for
continuing training, and 0.1 per cent for employment schemes. In 1989 54 collective
agreements (CAOs) contained provisions on such training funds.
4.
The United Kingdom
 
4.1 Introduction
The market-oriented philosophy of the Conservative government that came to power in
1979 marked the end of mildly corporatist approaches to policy-coordination based on ideas
of social partnership which had been pursued by previous Labour and Conservative
governments. The style of the Thatcher government was confrontational and the influence of
the unions in industrial relations and political system was regarded as a major obstacle to the
government's radical programme  of liberal reform. 
In the following period the trade union movement has suffered a considerable loss of
influence due both to the hostility of the government (manifest in several industrial relations
acts designed to weaken the institutional position of unions) and even more to the dramatic
decline and restructuring of British industry, which had a particularly strong impact on sectors
in which trade union strength was concentrated (e.g. mining and manufacturing). Whereas in
1980 there was at least one recognized union in 2/3 of workplaces, this was the case in only
½ of work places in 1990 (Edwards et al. 1992). 
Both employers' organization and especially trade unions are more fragmented and
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63In the British administrative reforms an executive agency has more managerial autonomy than a government
ministry, although its employees remain public servants. In other related organizational changes Skill Centers (the old
MSC's own training organizations) and the professional placement service (Fachvermittlung) were privatized.
64In 1982 even the obligation of the unemployed to register with the placement service was eliminated. See Reissert
1984:5-13 for an overview of the previous organization of labour market policy in the United Kingdom.
decentralized in the United Kingdom, where collective bargaining typically takes place at the
company level, trade unions are traditionally organized along occupational rather than industry
boundaries, and union jurisdictions overlap. Moreover, the traditional style in industrial
relations has been conflict-oriented rather than co-operative with high levels of industrial
conflict in comparison with Northern European 'social partnership' countries such as Austria,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden. 
The principal national representative of British employers is the Confederation of British
Industries (CBI) representing the views of employers in commerce and industry. Its members
includes more than 250,000 public and private enterprises, more than 200 trade associations
and employer oganizations. The National Federation of Small Business (FSB) represents 64,000
enterprises with ca. 528,000 employees in small and medium size businesses. 
The Trade Union Congress (TUC) is the principal national trade union confederation with
ca. 6.5 million members comprising ca. 80 per cent of all trade union members. The TUC,
which has only indirect influence on collective bargaining conducted by its constituent unions,
is represented in national consultative bodies. It should be mentioned parenthetically that the
British labour movement has historically had a close relationship to policy-making in Labour
governments through its special relationship to the Labour party. 
4.2 Tripartism in the public employment service
The British delivery system for active labour market polcy was radically transformed in
the late 1980s. The previous tripartite labour market authority (MSC) with comprehensive
responsibility for most active labour market programmes  was abolished and the major
functional activities of labour market policy reorganized. Responsibility for the implementation
of active programme s is now fragmented in specialized agencies with their own separate
implementation structures. The Employment Service (ES), which is responsible for placement
services and the administration of unemployment benefits (payment offices), was reorganized
as is a public "executive agency" 63 within the the Employment Department (since 1995 the
Department of Employment and Education). Responsibility for local implementation of training
and most other active programmes  was delegated to the private sector Training and Enterprise
Councils (TECs), which are employer-led rather than bipartite or tripartite. 
The rise and fall of tripartism: Manpower Services Commission 1973 - 1988
The establishment of the MSC in 1973 integrated training and placement services in an
independent, tripartite labour market authority with its own budget, personnel administration
and subordinate regional and local organizations. Although responsible for most active
programmes , the MSC was by design strictly separated from the administration and financing
of unemployment benefits. Local authorities remained responsible for counseling and placement
of school leavers ("Careers Service") and wage subsidy programmes  remained the direct
responsibility of the Employment Department.  The unemployment benefit offices, which had
already been separated from placement services in 1971,  were a separate organization  within
ED  with sole  responsibility for  administering  benefits  and  controlling availability  for
work.  64 
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65 Actually its transitory successor, the Training Commission as the MSC was called after the hiving off of
placement services to the independent Employment Service.
66 It is noteworthy that the government terminated the right of unions to be consulted on training programmes  at
unionized workplaces in February 1989 (King 1993: 227) 
67The TUC's criticisms were: 1)Training is underfunded; 2) the trainees do not receive a proper allowance; 3)
insufficient provision for trade union monitoring; 4) inadequate guarantees against compulsion onto the scheme; 5) and
against jobs substitution. See excerpts from "TUC Guidance on Employment Training," quoted in King 1993: 230. 
68 Despite the initial concerns of British trade unions and other critics, participation in the ET programme  has
in principle remained voluntary (unlike the Youth Training Scheme), although increasingly restrictive controls on the
eligibility of the adult unemployed for benefits have been introduced.
69 See King 1993 and Evans 1992 for surveys of these developments.
The MSC represented an effort at neo-corporatist integration of trade unions and
employers in public policy-making in the context of a new commitment to active labour market
policy (in a period of initially relatively tight labour markets). In addition to securing the co-
operation of the social partners at the industry and firm level, the tripartite structure was
expected to mobilize greater political support for active policies ("lobbying function"; Reissert
1984).
The MSC's tripartite governing body included three trade union and three employer's
representatives, two representatives of local authorities, one member from the vocational
training sector, and a chairman chosen by the government. Although formally independent of
the government in its day-to-day operations, the MSC was clearly subordinate to government
policy: Its chairman was chosen by the government, and its proposals had to be approved by
the responsible minister. Moreover, its budget was controlled though the MSC's dependence
on annual grants in the government budget. The MSC may have been capable of exercising
influence, but it was never independent (Evans 1992:16-17). This relatively centralized
organization also had tripartite Area Manpower Boards, which were supposed to provide a
mechanism for co-ordination at the operative regional level, but they had only advisory status.
The MSC was abolished after the withdrawal of trade union representation in connection
with the controversy over the introduction of the Employment Training programme  for the
adult unemployed. 65 The chronology of events was as follows: First the employment service
(placement) was removed from the MSC (1987/88), which then became the "Training
Commission." After the Trade Union Congress voted to withdraw representation from the
Training Commission and boycott the new Employment Training programme , the MSC's
training organization was initially transformed into a government agency within the
Employment Department (ED) and subsequently the  decentralized and employer-led TEC
delivery system was introduced in 1989/90. 66 
The trade unions objected in particular to the government's plans to pay participants only
a small supplement to their unemployment benefit instead of the rate for the job, fearing that
the scheme would become compulsory "workfare." 67 This controversy might not have led to
such a dramatic result if the unions and the Labour Party had not been at loggerheads with the
Thatcher government on a broad range of issues (Evans 92: 90f). 68 The breakdown of the MSC
suggests that tripartite administraions are more constrained than traditional bureaucratic
administrations by the need to secure a broad consensus for their policies. 
In retrospect it is not the abolition of the MSC but its survival and even expansion during
the 1980s under the Thatcher government that is noteworthy. 69 Despite internal union criticism,
the TUC essentially acquiesced in the Thatcher governments reorientation of the MSC toward
"a crisis management organization, mainly concerned in the short run with palliatives against
unemployment." (Evans 1992: 53). The government valued the continuing involvement of the
TUC through the MSC as a form of legitimation for its own ideological project. 
According to Evans (1992: 54ff) deliberations within the MSC were largely consensual
53
70 As is frequently the case, somewhat different arrangements exist in Scotland. Scottish Enterprise is the
Government's lead agency in the Scottish lowlands; Highlands and Islands Enterprise has similar responsibilities in north
and western Scotland. Their responsibilities are implemented by a network of 22 Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) in
Scotland. The functions delegated to the LECs are somewhat broader than those of the TECs. In contrast to the English and
Welsh TECs, the LECs are more active in local economic development including in particular infrastructure (Wicks,
Bennett, McCoshan 1992). Ministerial responsibility for the 7 Welsh TECs was transferred from the ED/TEED to the
Welsh Office in April of 1992.
and there were only three major disagreements: 1) changes in the YTS youth training scheme;
2) the issue of eligibility for the Community (job creation) programme ; 3) the removal of the
employment service from the MSC's jurisdiction. On YTS union representatives pushed in
particular for control of training quality and against making the scheme compulsory for youth
receiving supplementary benefit. Without assurance of training quality, they saw YTS as
merely providing cheap labour for employers and an employment policy quick fix for
government. On both issues trade union representatives were, in their own view, successful in
influencing training policy in the mid-1980s (Evans 1992: 72ff.). 
4.3 The employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)
The establishment of the TEC-system began in 1989 after the publication of the
Governments White Paper "Employment for the 1990s." According to the "White Paper" the
TECs were founded on five major principles:
C employer-led
C locally based
C focus for all training and enterprise matters in their local area
C enterprising organizations
C performance based
After a developmental phase, the first TECs became operational in April 1990 and all 82
TECs were operational by October of 1991. TECs are in law private companies which manage
labour market training and related programmes  in 82 local areas of England and Wales on a
contract basis. A somewhat different system of "Local Enterprise Councils" (LECs) exists in
Scotland. 70
The TECs are headed by a board of directors, two-thirds of which must be chief
executives or top operating officers of local enterprises. TEC directors serve without pay and
as individuals rather than as representatives of their organizations. There is no similar re-
quirement of representation for trade unions, local authorities or public and non-profit training
providers, although these actors are in practice represented on many TEC boards. The
manufacturing sector and mid-size to large firms with over 200 employees are heavily over
represented among private sector directors on TEC boards (Vaughan 1993; Bennett and
McCoshan 93: 188). 
 The TECs carry out the planning, management, and control tasks in the delivery of
training and enterprise programmes  that were previously the responsibility of the old MSC
Training Division (subsequently Training Agency) Area Offices. In essence these management
functions have now been contracted out to private organizations. The TECs are, however, not
simply private entities but a new variant of an older British tradition of quangos (quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations). 
Although their status as private companies and the involvement of employers in their
management gives them a great deal more independence than the subordinate administrative
offices that they replaced, their freedom of action remains in practice highly constrained by
contractual restrictions on the allocation of their resources in TEC operating agreements with
the Dept. of Employment and Education, accounting practices imposed on the expenditure of
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public funds, and by their de facto status as dependent suppliers of training-management
services to a dominant single purchaser (DEE). Recent changes have given the TECs somewhat
greater independence: Since 1994 voluntary mergers of local TECs and chambers of commerce
are possible (which has occurred in 9 cases); this development can be expected to give the
merged TECs greater leverage vis-à-vis the DfEE. Beginning in 1995 TECs reaching specified
performance standards are eligible for 3 year (previously one year) operating agreements,
which in the future is supposed to become the norm for all TECs.
The impact of governance by employers on active programmes 
Employers' involvement: Although employers have a majority of seats on TEC boards
their influence on policies is limited by contract requirements and performance targets in the
organization of active programmes  within the ministry. Moreover, it is not clear how much
TEC boards actually influence even local policies. Although TEC boards meet relatively
infrequently - typically once a month (Vaughan 1993), evidence from case studies suggests that
the TEC boards are most active in representing the TEC to the public and the business
community than in policy making and that they function as a sounding board in ratifying
policies developed by the chief executive and other senior staff (Crowley-Bainton 1993; Mosley
and Degen 1994). 
Participation by employers on TEC boards or in another capacity (e.g. in sectoral
groups) is voluntary and unpaid. The principal motives appear to be those of public service in
the field of local economic development and training, an area closely related to the concerns
of the local business community. 
Effects on training orientation: It was initially feared that devolution of responsibility
to the employer-led TECs would entail a shift in public training away from the reintegration
of problem groups toward serving the skill needs of the private business sector (Meager 1991).
Although the TECs are - given the interests of their employer-led boards and their broad
mandate - inclined to invest more resources in training for the employed or readily employable
and meeting skill shortages rather than in problem groups, this has not taken place because
eligibility criteria for training are defined by the ministry and not by the TECs (Mosley and
Degen 1994). The extraordinary focus of labour market policy in the United Kingdom on
problem groups, particularly youth and the long-term unemployed (>6 months), is of long
standing and has been unaffected by recent changes in the British labour administration.
Responsiveness of training to local labour market needs: An assumption of the TEC
reforms was that the previous more centralized system failed to identify and respond to the
diverse needs of local labour markets, and that local business leaders are best at steering
training programmes  toward these goals. Circumstantial evidence after several years of
experience casts doubt on this assumption. At least in the case of adult training, the central
targeting of training on problem groups has to a large extent effectively prevented the
employer-led TECs from orienting adult training toward skill shortages. While many TECs
might prefer, for example, to run smaller programme  with higher quality training within
existing budgets, they do not have the freedom of action to do so (Mosley and Degen 1994).
Finally, it is not self-evident that the 12-16 local business executives on TEC boards
know best about training needs for the unemployed. Interviews with TEC officials managing
adult training suggest that employers on TEC boards show little knowledge of or interest in
day-to-day TEC decisions about the allocation of training resources. Such decisions appear to
be made by the professional staff in a way not very different from in the past (Mosley and
Degen 1994).
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71Many TECs  accumulated substantial surpluses.
Efficiency: A principal assumption of the TEC reforms was that that business people in
a private sector environment will be more efficient in providing training services. This
expectation is based not only on attitudinal differences but also on increased personnel and
financial flexibility as a result of the shift of training management from the public to the private
sector, for example, the possibility carrying over operating surpluses to subsequent years.
This hoped-for effect of the TEC reforms on training is difficult to assess both because
of the lack of hard evidence with which to compare training costs and results over time as well
as the ambiguity of "efficiency" in training programmes . The ambiguity of efficiency
measured in terms of trends in costs per training week, qualification or placement is that these
indicators do not measure training quality and fail to reflect selection bias. The introduction of
the TEC system in 1990/91 coincided with cutbacks in funding for adult training and a shake
out of training providers, who came under increasing cost pressure. Moreover, there are now
no fixed prices for training services and prices reflect regional cost levels more than in the past.
There is a widespread impression that increased administrative flexibility and new budgetary
incentives have brought cost savings, whereas in the previous system there was little incentive
to save (Mosley and Degen 1994). 71 
III. Statistical appendix: Corporatism and active labour market policy:
Empirical evidence from OECD data
(Stefan Speckesser)
1.  Introduction
The analysis is based on data collected by the OECD, especially the OECD labour market
policy expenditure data bank. The OECD data make possible a cross-national comparison
between different institutional regimes with a sample that is large enough for statistical
analysis. The OECD data are derived from national data sources and adjusted insofar as
possible to international standards. As in all cross national comparisons, there are problems of
comparability. In particular institutional differences may lead to misleading information: For
example, in some countries vocational training centered in the education system may not be
reported as labour market policy expenditure, while in other countries vocational training may
be reported in labour market policy expenditure. 
The following section (2.) presents a descriptive analysis of industrial relations indicators
for corporatism and patterns of labour market policy expenditure. Thereafter a multivariate
analysis examines the impact of the social partners and corporatism on the level and
composition of labour market policy (3.). 
2.
Descriptive analysis of industrial relations systems and active labour market policy
In most industrialized countries, the system of industrial relations plays an important role
for economic and labour market performance (cf. Janoski 1997). The actors in industrial
relations, "the social partners", constitute a "web of rules" (OECD 1994: 167), providing
procedures for conflict management. We hypothesize too that the characteristics of the
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industrial relations system and the integration of social partners in the policy process have an
impact on the level and composition of active measures. Before discussing the impact of
corporatism on public labour market policy, we survey the major trends in union membership,
centralization of industrial relations and their importance for the employment system.
2.1 Patterns of industrial relations
Union density
Table 1 shows data on unionization and collective agreement coverage for 20 OECD
countries for the years 1980, 1990 and 1994. We find large differences in the level of
unionization, especially for the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare states with Sweden at
the top (91 per cent), followed by Finland, Denmark and Norway for the early 1990s (col. 3)
and some conservative welfare state regimes at the bottom (Spain and France). The importance
of unions as societal actors varies among the conservative welfare states: In Germany and
Austria, unionization is relatively high whereas only 9 per cent of all employees are union
members in France. We also find no clear pattern of unionization for neo-liberal regimes:
Unions in the United States have a relatively low share with 16 per cent, whereas in New
Zealand and Britain unionization is still high. In almost all countries, with the exception of the
Scandinavian welfare states and Spain, union density has declined over the last 15 years. The
reasons for this trend can be found in structural change (e.g. the decline in classical unionized
industries such as steel and coal), on the one hand, and in the process of redifferentiation in
qualifications and the new role of women in the labour market, on the other hand (cf. O'Reilly,
Spee 1997). 
Collective bargaining coverage
In all countries the percentage of employees covered by collective agreements is greater
than the union density because unions also play a broader role for standard setting in
employment relationships. Coverage ranges from 98 per cent in Austria, with comparable
higher rates in France, Germany, and Scandinavian countries, to 18 per cent in the United
States. The regulation of employment relationship through coverage by collective agreements
has been relatively stable over the past 15 years except in New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, where a marked decline occurred. These figures should be interpreted with caution
because too little qualitative information about coverage is available. Even if a high percentage
of employment contracts are collectively regulated by the social partners, we do not know to
what extent collective agreements actually set standards: At least in some countries, collective
agreements have become more flexible (Büchtemann 1993), even though coverage rates remain
high (e.g. France, Germany, Austria, cf.  1).
Centralization
In liberal welfare states, the degree of centralization was historically low and did not
change over the past 15 years. In other countries experiencing a "radical regime shift" like the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, the degree of centralization changed: Most collective
bargaining now takes place at the plant and firm level. The conservative welfare states
remained relatively stable over time with a centralization index of 2 (see table 1). In Sweden,
Denmark and Finland the degree of centralization decreased but is still relatively high. If we
interpret these data as an indicator for the role of the social partners, they suggest that unions
have become less important over time. 
57
Unfortunately no cross-national data on employer's associations are available. We can
only use an indicator for co-ordination from Calmfors and Driffill (1988), which attempts to
measure the institutional congruency of employers' associations and unions. Highly coordinated
wage-bargaining structures are found in the Scandinavian welfare state regimes but also in
Japan (see table 2). 
Social peace and consensus
Social peace is an important indicator for co-operative behavior by the social partners.
Coordinated economies have in general fewer labour conflicts and days lost due to strikes as
they are equipped with several institutional arrangements that inhibit open conflicts and
facilitate consensus. Therefore we use labour conflicts as an indicator for the degree of
coordination in national employment systems. Table 3 shows the development of labour conflict
across the countries of our sample. In general, strikes have declined in all countries except
Austria since 1990. There are, nevertheless, still marked differences in the cross-national
frequency of industrial conflict. 
Synthetic analysis
The boxplots (figures 1- 2) show different levels of unionization and coverage according
to different welfare state regime types as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990): We find the
highest average value for union density in social democratic welfare states, followed by the
conservative and the liberal regimes. In terms of coverage of collective bargaining, there is
hardly any difference between social democratic and conservative regimes. The outcomes of
collective bargaining on wage policies can be seen in the third plot: Wage differentiation is
high in liberal, moderate in conservative and relatively low in social democratic regimes.
"Egalitarian" wage policies can be regarded as an indicator for relatively coordinated behavior
of the social partners in general, which is assumed to have an influence on labour market policy
(table 3).
2.2 Trends in labour market policy
Total expenditure
In 1985 total expenditure for LMP ranged from 5.0 per cent of GDP in Denmark to 0.5
per cent in Switzerland and active expenditure from 3.9 per cent in Denmark to 0.3 per cent
in Switzerland. Average expenditure is higher in 1994; Denmark still has the highest
expenditure level, followed by Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Expenditure for active
measures ranges from 5.2 per cent of the GDP in Denmark to 0.3 per cent in Japan.
 
Activity rates
The activity rate of labour market policy expenditure has also changed over the last 10
years. Although Sweden still has the highest activity rate, the conservative governments of the
continent increased their share for active measures, especially France and Italy are now among
the most active regimes (figure 6). 
If we examine more detailed expenditure data, we find that training measures are
increasingly important. Especially in liberal and conservative employment regimes, training
shares are close to or above 50 per cent of all expenditure. The social democratic regimes,
which traditionally focus their labour market programmes  more towards subsidized
employment, still have a relatively low share for training measures, especially Sweden and the
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Netherlands. In the Netherlands, we see significantly lower expenditure figures for the 1990s
(figure 7).
Cyclical patterns in activity rates
 The activity rate is also assumed to depend on the business cycle insofar as active
measures are designed for temporary adjustment of excess labour supply. Since OECD data are
available only for the last 10 years, it is not yet possible to draw a complete picture of the
activity rates. For the years of the crisis 1993 - 1995, we see a significant decrease in activity
rates, but this might be caused by the rising level of unemployment. At the end of the crisis,
both liberal and social democratic welfare states increased their activity rates, whereas the
conservative welfare state regimes show a slightly declining trend (figure 8).
2.3 The social partners and labour market policy
PES tripartism and labour market policy expenditure
Figures 9-11 distinguish between employment service regimes according to whether or
not there is a quasi-independent tripartite labour market authority administered jointly by
government representatives, employers' associations and trade unions. Our hypothesis that
there is a significant variation between these two groups of countries in active expenditure can
be verified for the years 1985 and 1990, where significantly higher expenditure exists for
countries with tripartism. In 1994, however, there is no longer an obvious difference between
the tripartite systems and other countries.
Corporatism and wage replacement rates
We find practically no difference between the tripartite and non-tripartite countries with
regard to short term wage replacement rates for the unemployed in the late 1980s (figures 12).
For long-term wage replacement rates, we find higher values for men in countries where the
social partners participate in tripartite labour administrations (figure 13). 
Corporatism, coordinated economies and LMP expenditure
Correlation coefficients between indicators of corporatism and labour market policy show
significant statistical relationships between Calmfor's index and total expenditure for labour
market policy but only in 1994 (table 5). Union density also has a statistically significant
influence on total expenditure in 1994. Correlation coefficients for activity rates and benefit
duration are never significant. We can interpret these findings as providing evidence for an
impact of the social partners in coordinated employment regimes on total expenditure for labour
market policy but not on activity rates.
 
3. Multivariate analysis 
The influence of the social partners on level and design of labour market policy
expenditure is examined in different multiple linear regression models (see table 6-1). Our
models test the influence of social partners within an institutional model that also takes into
account the level of unemployment and the political system. Two different indicators for the
role of the social partners are used: union density and conflict/ consensus orientation. 
a) Union density can be regarded as an indicator for the importance of unions: The
higher the share of the labour force organised in unions in the employment system, the more
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72 The authors want to thank Thomas R.Cusack for kindly providing us the data.
representation and legitimacy they have as a societal actor and therefore more influence on
welfare state arrangements for dependent employees. Examples of possible unions goals with
respect to active and passive measures are high wage replacement rates in case of
unemployment, high pensions and early retirement schemes as well as a well functioning
system of continuous training. The level of unionisation therefore is expected to be positively
related to expenditure for labour market policy. Unionization (U) is defined as:
U = UM / DE (1)
where
 UM is the total number of union members;
 DE total dependent employment.
b) The indicator for conflict orientation in our case is the days lost due to working
conflicts per 1000 employees. We assume that not only the level of unionisation is essential for
social partnership, but also the degree of social peace and the capacity to co-operate with
employers. Consensus is necessary to create stable governance structures which influence in
the long-run the welfare system and expenditure. Consensus (C) is defined as: 
C = DL / DE (2)
where
 DL is the total of days lost due to working-conflicts;
 DE total dependent employment.
c) We expect policy formation on active and passive measures to depend on political
constellations in party power. We include the political system in our model by using a measure
for the "ideological center of gravity". We expect that left parties will be more responsive to
labour market issues and, therefore, that increased support for left parties will be manifest in
higher expenditure for labour market policy. The ideological center of gravity in a political
system is calculated by multiplying the share of votes times an ideological rank score, which
has the value of 1 for ultra-left and 5 for ultra-right parties (cf. Cusack 1992: 16). 72 The
political center of gravity (CGR) is defined as:
CGR = S xi pi (3)
where 
xi measures the vote share of the party;
and pi measures the individual ideological rank score (1 for extremely left parties, 5 for
ultra right parties). 
Since a predominance of left parties results in a lower value of the indicator, a negative
estimator can be interpreted as evidence for a positive influence of left party strength on labour
market policy expenditure. 
d) Finally, we include the national unemployment rates in our model as a control
variable for the influence of the national labour market conditions on the level and composition
of expenditure. The unemployment rate (UER) is defined as follows: 
UER = AL / TLF (4)
where 
AL is total number of unemployed;
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TLF the total labour force (standardised values). 
The dependent variables in our models are expenditure rates for passive and active
labour market policy as percentage of the GDP (with the subgroups training and subsidised
employment for active policies) as well as the overall "activity rate of labour market policy"
indicating the share of active measures on all expenditure. 
The models are tested for two periods: 1985 to 1990 and 1991 to 1994. Cyclical and
extraordinary peaks in the data set are smoothed by taking an average of the unionization and
conflict indicators for the last five years (t-4 to t). The unemployment rate is lagged one year
(t-1) because we assume that unemployment will influence LMP at a later point in time. The
variable indicating the ideological center of gravity is also a five year average (to t-4). The
dependent variables are for the years 1990 and 1994 respectively, separating our analysis into
two periods. With these assumptions, we follow Janoski's model of state intervention in ALMP
(Janoski 1996: 697 ff.).
EXPalmp = a1 U + a2C + a3CGR + a4 UER + e (5)
The analysis is based on the data collected by the OECD, enabling on the one hand a
cross-national comparison between nationally different institutional regimes, on the other hand
a sample that is large enough for statistical analysis. The OECD data refer to national data
sources, that are adjusted according to international standards as far as it is possible.
Regression estimates 1985-1990
Table 6-1shows the results of the regression analysis for the period 1985 to 1990. A
significant influence of the measures of social partnership on the level of labour market policy
expenditure can be seen in four of the five models, above all in the case of total and passive
expenditure. whereas the other variables have ambiguous effects on the dependent variables.
Total ALMP expenditure
 We see a statistically significant positive influence of union density on total LMP
expenditure as hypothesized; moreover, conflict orientation, i.e. the absence of social
partnership as measured by strike rates, is negatively related to total expenditure as
hypothesized. Surprisingly, the variable for the ideological center of gravity shows the expected
sign but is not statistically significant: There is no evidence for a positive relation between the
strength of left parties in elections and total expenditure for LMP. The unemployment rate
finally shows the highest influence on the expenditure level. The overall explanatory power of
the model is acceptable: F has a value of 10.2, adjusted R² (ratio explained to total variation)
has value of .68. 
Passive measures
The influence of Social Partnership on passive measure expenditure has also been
examined. We see almost the same influence of the independent variables on the expenditure
level for passive measures as in the model for total LMP expenditure. The influence of the
social partners measured with union density is statistically significant and positive, whereas the
strike indicator for consensus shows the expected negative influence of the level of expenditure
for passive measures on GDP. Again, the statistical tests of the model indicate that the
explanatory power of the model is good: almost 65 per cent of the variation is explained by the
variables included.
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Expenditure for subsidised employment and training
The next two models examine the impact of our measures of social partnership on two
disaggregated components of active policy: subsidized employment and training. The regression
estimates show a weak but significant positive impact of union density on both types of active
measures, but the strike indicator for social partnership is not significant. The sign of the
estimator for union density shows the expected direction, i.e. higher union density is associated
with higher levels of expenditure. Nevertheless, both models show little explanatory power and
are not statistically significant (F-value of 1.6 and .09 and low values for adjusted R²).
Activity rate
The overall activity of LMP (measured as ratio of active expenditure to all expenditure)
cannot be explained by the variables in the model. The variables included are not significant,
although their sign shows in the right direction with the exception of the conflict variable. The
estimator of the unemployment rate has a negative sign, indicating that a higher unemployment
rate leads to a lower activity rate.
Regression estimates 1990-1994
Table 6-2 summarizes the results of the regression analysis for the period 1990 to 1994.
Total  ALMP expenditure 
Concerning the influence of social partnership on total expenditure, the regression
results are similar to those reported above for the 1990-1994: The indicators for both
unionization and industrial conflict are significant with signs pointing in the expected direction.
The unemployment rate again shows the greatest influence, and is even more important as a
determinant of total labour market policy expenditure than in the previous period.  The
estimator for the political variable in this model shows the expected sign but is not statistically
significant. With an R² value of .75 and a high F-value, the results are statistically strongly
significant. 
Passive measures
The dependent variable expenditure for passive measures is highly influenced by the
same three independent variables in the model. The influence of union density is less than in
the model for total expenditure in the same period, but still higher than on training and
subsidised employment. As in the case of total expenditure, labour market conditions
(unemployment rate) have the greatest impact on passive expenditure and the political variable
(ideological center of gravity) shows the expected negative sign but is not statistically
significant. The overall explanatory power of the model is good (adjusted R²= .67)
Expenditure for subsidized employment and training
In contrast to the earlier period, the indicators for social partnership (union density and
strike rates) show a weak but statistically significant influence on expenditure for training and
subsidised employment in the 1990-94 period. Like in the previous models, the unemployment
rate is the most  influential explanatory variable, and the political variable (ideological center
of gravity) is not significant. 
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Activity rate
As in the previous period, none of the variables in our model are significant and the overall
explanatory power of the model is very low (adjusted R²= .07). 
Conclusion
The results of our analysis can be interpreted as providing robust evidence for a
relationship between corporatism as measured by union density and strike rates on both total
and passive expenditure for labour market policy as a percentage of GDP. If we interpret
corporatism in this sense as a proxy for social partnership, we can conclude that labour market
policy expenditure is influenced by social partners more through the general role of the social
partners in the employment systems than through their institutionalised role in tripartite labour
administrations (see figures 9- 11 in the Appendix below). On the other hand, the evidence for
an impact of social partnership on active expenditure (here training and subsidized employment)
is weak and inconsistent. Left party power is not statistically significant in any of the models
examined. Finally, as expected, the unemployment rate is strongly and significantly positively
related to both active and passive labour market expenditure in seven of the eight models
examined. Neither social partnership nor any of the other variables included in the model are
statistically significant when regressed on activity rates, i.e. the ratio of active to passive
measures in labour market policy expenditure. 
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4 Statistical Tables and Figures
Table 1: Data on Unions in the OECD Countries
Union Density Collective Bargaining Coverage
1980 1990 1994 1980 1990 1994
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Natherlands
New Zeland
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
48.0
56.0
56.0
36.0
76.0
70.0
18.0
36.0
n.a.
49.0
31.0
35.0
56.0
57.0
61.0
9.0
80.0
31.0
50.0
22.0
41.0
46.0
51.0
36.0
71.0
72.0
10.0
33.0
n.a.
39.0
25.0
26.0
45.0
56.0
32.0
13.0
83.0
27.0
39.0
16.0
35.0
42.0
54.0
38.0
76.0
81.0
9.0
29.0
n.a.
39.0
24.0
26.0
30.0
58.0
32.0
19.0
91.0
27.0
34.0
16.0
88.0
98.0
90.0
37.0
69.0
95.0
85.0
91.0
n.a.
85.0
28.0
76.0
67.0
75.0
70.0
76.0
86.0
53.0
70.0
26.0
80.0
98.0
90.0
38.0
69.0
95.0
92.0
90.0
n.a.
3.0
23.0
71.0
67.0
75.0
75.0
76.0
86.0
53.0
47.0
18.0
80.0
98.0
90.0
36.0
69.0
95.0
95.0
92.0
82.0
21.0
81.0
31.0
76.0
71.0
78.0
89.0
50.0
47.0
18.0
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1997
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Table 2: Corporatism Indicators
Corporatism
Ranking
Adjusted
Ranking
Index of
Corporatism
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Natherlands
New Zeland
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
10.0
1.0
8.0
17.0
4.0
5.0
11.0
6.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
7.0
9.0
2.0
11.0
3.0
15.0
12.0
16.0
17.0
1.0
14.0
4.0
2.0
8.0
16.0
9.0
12.0
11.0
10.0
13.0
15.0
2.0
16.0
3.0
6.0
12.0
5.0
6.0
1.0
7.0
7.0
4.0
6.0
9.0
2.0
11.0
12.0
3.0
6.0
8.0
4.0
12.0
4.0
3.0
11.0
7.0
Col.1: Ranking of degree of centralization of wage bargains as measured by Calmfors Driffill (1988)
Col. 2: Calmfors and Drifill adjusted the original ranking on the basis that low degrees of
decentralization in wage bargaining are better for economic performance than middle range levels
Calmfors Driffill (1988)
Col.: This index not only captures centralization but also the extent of consensus and the existence of
formal arbitration procedures. This is due to Tarantelli (1986)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1987
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Table 3: Wage Differentials
Wage Differentials*
1980 1990
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Natherlands
New Zeland
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
2.600
3.400
2.500
4.000
3.100
2.600
4.300
2.000
2.100
2.000
3.000
4.800
2.800
3.500
2.300
4.400
3.000
2.500
4.600
2.300
2.000
2.600
2.100
3.900
5.600
*Ratio of first decile of earnings.
Source: Janoski 1996: 799
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Table 4: Expenditure for Active and Passive Labour Market Policy in OECD Countries
1985 1994
Active Passive Total Active Passive Total
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Natherlands
New Zeland
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
0.4
0.3
1.3
0.6
1.1
0.9
0.7
0.8
1.5
0.5
0.2
1.1
0.8
0.7
0.4
0.4
2.1
0.2
0.7
0.3
1.3
1.0
3.4
1.9
3.9
1.3
2.4
1.4
3.7
1.0
0.4
3.0
0.7
0.5
0.4
2.9
0.8
0.3
2.0
0.6
1.7
1.3
4.6
2.5
5.0
2.2
3.1
2.2
5.2
1.5
0.6
4.2
1.4
1.2
0.8
3.3
2.9
0.5
2.8
0.8
0.8
0.4
1.4
0.6
2.0
1.7
1.3
1.4
1.6
0.9
0.1
1.4
0.8
1.3
0.7
0.6
3.0
0.4
0.6
0.2
1.9
1.5
2.9
1.6
5.2
4.7
2.0
2.3
3.1
1.0
0.3
3.3
1.6
1.3
1.1
3.1
2.8
1.4
1.6
0.4
2.6
1.9
4.3
2.2
7.2
6.4
3.2
3.7
4.7
2.0
0.4
4.6
2.4
2.7
1.8
3.7
5.7
1.9
2.2
0.6
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, several volumes.
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Table 5: Cross-Correlations all OECD Countries
Calmfors
Index
Corporation
Index
Union Density
1990 1994
Activity Rate 90
.23
.15
.15
-.09
.19
Activity Rate 94
.34
.15
.21
-.06
.18
.81
Average Benefit Duration
.21
.14
.47
.41
.19
.08
Total Expenditure 90
.37
.15
.17
-.05
.19
.84
.34
.19
.16
Total Expenditure 94
.58
.15
*.02
-.20
.18
.42
.68
.19
*.001
*significant at 5% level or better
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, several volumes, own calculations
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Table 6-1: Regression Estimates for Level and Composition of ALMP Programme
Expenditure † 1985- 1990
Dependent Variabl
es
Expendi
ture LMP
Passive
Measures
Subsidi
z e d
Employment
Training Activity
Rate†† 
Independ
ent 
Variables
U n i o n
density
.0526* .0360* .0050* .0036 -.0003
av. t-5, t .0110 .0094 .0025 .0021 .0021
Conflict -.0027* -.0023* -.0008 -.0007 .0001
av. t-5, t .0012 .0010 .002 .002 .0002
Ideolog.
Center
1.160 1.1077 .1218 .02860 -.1341
of grav.,
t-10 t-5
.6810 .5797 .1551 .1306 .1293
Unemplo
yment 
.3546* .2939* .0232* .0060 -.0234
Rate t-1 .0610 .0519 .0139 .0117 .0116
Constant -5.357 -4.926 -.5823 -.0659 .9216
2.386 2.0306 .5432 .4575 .4530
R² .7586 .72857 .3362 .21411 .33429
adj. R² .68432 .64505 .1319 -.0277 .12945
F 10.213* 8.7234* 1.6457 .88542 1.6320
N 17 17 17 17 17
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The table shows the coefficients and the standard errors (below) of the regression estimates.
† The dependent variable is expenditure for different LMP measures and total expenditure
as  per cent of GDP.
†† Activity Rate measures expenditure for ALMP as  per cent of all Expenditure for LMP.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, ILO Yearbook, OECD Labour Force Statistics, own
calculations, several volumes
* significant at 5 per cent level or better
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Table 6-2: Regression Estimates for Level and Composition of ALMP Programme
Expenditure † 1990- 1994
Dependent Variabl
es
Expendi
ture LMP
Passive
Meas.
Subsidi
z e d
Employment
Training Activity
Rate†† 
Independ
ent 
Variables
U n i o n
density
.0396* .0204* .008* .0051* .1514
av. t-5, t .0125 .0099 .002 .0018 .1391
Conflict -.011* -.0080* -.0013* -.0013* .0116
av. t-5, t .0035 .0027 .0005 .0004 .0391
Ideolog.
Center
-.8534 -.4655 .0217 -.0384 -4.5621
of grav.,
t-10 t-5
.9344 .7413 .1518 .1341 10.3956
Unemplo
yment 
.3797* .2967* .0396* .0363* -.7807
Rate t-1 .0830 .0659 .0135 .0119 .9236
Constant 1.617 .6763 -.3973 -.0402 45.6725
3.025 2.399 .4915 .4341 33.6508
R² .8009 .7477 .7565 .6883 .18090
adj. R² .7397 .6700 .6816 .5923 -.07114
F 13.077* 9.629* 10.098* 7.1752* .71775
N 17 17 17 17 17
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The table shows the coefficients and the standard errors (below) of the regression estimates.
† The dependent variable is expenditure for different LMP measures and total expenditure
as  per cent of GDP.
†† Activity Rate measures expenditure for ALMP as  per cent of all Expenditure for LMP
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, ILO Yearbook, OECD Labour Force Statistics, own
calculations, several volumes.
* significant at 5 per cent level or better
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics:
Valid
Variable   Mean   Std Dev Minimum Maximum  N  
 Label
ACTGR90        .37        .14       .20       .66     20   Activity Rate of LMP, 90
ACTGR94      32.25      10.00     16.13     51.83     19   Activity Rate of LMP, 94
ALQ89         6.85       4.11     .5000   16.9000     20   1989 ALQ, OECD standard
ALQ93         9.64       4.82    2.5000   22.4000     20   1993 ALQ, OECD standard
CEGR8085      2.97        .34    2.2649    3.6933     19   Ideological  center of gravity
CEGR8590      2.97        .31    2.4581    3.5905     19   Ideological  center of gravity
EXP_T90       2.28       1.33       .39      5.64     20   Expenditure for total LMP,90
EXP_T94       3.20       1.82       .39      7.16     20   Expenditure for total LMP,94
EXPAM90        .78        .43       .13      1.69     20   Expenditure for ALMP, 90
EXPAM94       1.06        .69     .0900    2.9700     20   Expenditure for ALMP, 94
EXPPM90       1.49       1.05       .14      4.38     20   Expenditure Passive Measures, 90
EXPPM94       2.15       1.27     .3000    5.1500     20   Expenditure Passive Measures, 94
EXPSE90        .16        .17       .00       .58     20   Expend. subsidised employment, 90
EXPSE94        .27        .28     .0000     .8700     20   Expend. subsidised employment, 94
EXPT90         .21        .15       .02       .53     20   Expenditure for Training, 90
EXPT94         .27        .21     .0200     .7600     20   Expenditure for Training, 94
MEUD1        43.11      19.39     11.00     81.50     19   Av. Union Density 80-85
MEUD2        40.03      21.07      9.50     87.00     19   Av. Union Density 85- 90
MEWC1       170.79     182.59       .30    618.29     20   Av. Days lost work.conflict, 80-85
MEWC2       102.49     113.21       .34    429.55     20   Av. Days lost work.conflict, 85-90
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* Data on Ireland are not available
Note: Union density measures the proportion of employees organized in union as percentage
of all employees. The data are structured by the type of welfare states according to Goesta
Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990). Social democratic welfare states: DK,
FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F, IRL, I, A, P and E; liberal welfare
states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA. Data on union density not available for IRL.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x 0.75) quartile and the lower (x 0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x 0.25)-1.5 (x 0.75 -x  0.25) and (x 0.75)-1.5 (x 0.75 -x 0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Coverage Rates measure the employees covered by collective bargaining as proportion
of all employees. The data are structured by the type of welfare states according to Goesta
Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990). Social democratic welfare states: DK,
FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F, IRL, I, A, P and E; liberal welfare
states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA. Data on coverage rate not available for IRL.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x 0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box. The data are structured by the type of welfare
states according to Goesta Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990). Social
democratic welfare states: DK, FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F, IRL,
I, A, P and E; liberal welfare states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA. Data on union
density not available for IRL. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
76
Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box. The data are structured by the type of welfare
states according to Goesta Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990). Social
democratic welfare states: DK, FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F, IRL,
I, A, P and E; liberal welfare states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA. Data on union
density not available for IRL. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box. The data are structured by the type of welfare
states according to Goesta Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990). Social
democratic welfare states: DK, FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F, IRL,
I, A, P and E; liberal welfare states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA. Data on union
density not available for IRL. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Figure 6
Note: The activity rate measures the share of active labour market policy expenditure as
percentage of all expenditure for labour market policy. Active measures include measures for
the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and further training, passive
measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The countries are ranked by 1994 values.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
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Figure 7
Note: The ratio of training expenditure as percentage of total expenditures for active labour
market policy indicates the degree of supply orientation of national active labour market
policies. Training measures include training for the unemployed as well as for employed.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
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Figure 8
Note: The activity rate measures the share of active labour market policy expenditure as
percentage of all expenditure for labour market policy. Active measures include measures for
the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and further training, passive
measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The data are structured by the type of
welfare states according to Goesta Esping-Andersens typology (Esting-Andersen 1990).
Social democratic welfare states: DK, FIN, NL, N and S; conservative welfare states: B, D, F,
IRL, I, A, P and E; liberal welfare states: AUS, UK, J, CDN, NZ, CH, and USA.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
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Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box, the second box shows the expenditure for active
labour market policy. The data are structured by countries, in which institutional corporatism
exists, i.e. tripartite boards of the labour administration , or where the social partners are not
involved in the labour market administration. Source: OECD Employment Outlook, several
volumes.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box, the second box shows the expenditure for active
labour market policy. The data are structured by countries, in which institutional corporatism
exists, i.e. tripartite boards of the labour administration , or where the social partners are not
involved in the labour market administration. Data on union density not available for IRL.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, several volumes, Mosley 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Expenditure for labour market is measured as percentage of GDP. Active measures
includes measures for the integration of youth and disabled, subsidised employment and
further training , passive measures comprise wage replacement expenditure. The value for
total expenditure can be seen in the first box, the second box shows the expenditure for active
labour market policy. The data are structured by countries, in which institutional corporatism
exists, i.e. tripartite boards of the labour administration , or where the social partners are not
involved in the labour market administration. Data on union density not available for IRL.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, several volumes, Mosley 1997.
Methodological remarks: The boxplot shows the relevant characteristics of the data. The size
of the box indicates the difference between the upper (x0.75) quartile and the lower (x0.25)
quartile, so that 50% of the observed values are within the area of the box. The line within the
box indicates the median of the sample. The horizontal lines above and below the box show
the values that are 1.5 times more or less the difference between the lower and the upper
quartile (x0.25)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25) and (x0.75)-1.5 (x0.75-x0.25), extreme values are marked
individually.
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Note: Wage replacement rates for unemployment with up to six months unemployment
experience, average for all unemployed. The data are structured by countries, in which
institutional corporatism exists, i.e. tripartite boards of the labour administration , or where the
social partners are not involved in the labour market administration.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1991: 234, Mosley 1997.
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Note: Wage replacement rates for unemployment with more than six months unemployment
experience, average for all unemployed. The data are structured by countries, in which
institutional corporatism exists, i.e. tripartite boards of the labour administration , or where the
social partners are not involved in the labour market administration.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1991: 234, Mosley 1997.
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